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INTRODUCTION
In 2003, the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed the
murder conviction and life sentence imposed on Lionel Tate, who was
twelve years old when he killed his six-year-old neighbor.' Since
Lionel was reported to be the youngest person in modern times to be
sent to prison for life, the case had generated considerable debate,
and the decision was appealed on several grounds. What persuaded
the appellate court that the conviction could not stand, however, was
the trial court's rejection of a petition by Lionel's attorney for an
evaluation of his client's competence to assist counsel and to make a
decision about the state's plea offer.2
This case highlights an issue that has hovered almost unnoticed
in the background of the recent punitive juvenile justice reforms that
have resulted in criminal prosecutions of young teens and. adult-like
sentences in juvenile court. This legal trend has been the subject of
intense political and academic debates, focusing on whether the
reforms fulfill the criminal law goals of public protection, individual
1. Lionel was tried after declining the state's offer of a plea agreement that included
a three-year sentence. Although his attorney supported accepting the plea, Lionel's
mother was opposed. See Michael Browning et al., Boy, 14, Gets Life in TV Wrestling
Death: Killing of 6-Yr.-Old Playmate Wasn't Just Horseplay, Florida Judge Says, CHI.
SUN-TIMES, Mar. 10, 2001, at 1. For a description by Lionel's attorney of his client's
comprehension of the proceedings, see infra note 10.
2. Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); see also Abby
Goodnough, Youngster Given Life Term for Killing Gets New Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11,
2003, at A28; Curtis Krueger, Young Killer Gets Second Chance, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Dec. 11, 2003, at 1A; Manuel Roig-Franzia, Killer of 6-Year-Old to Get a New Trial,
WASH. PosT, Dec. 11, 2003, at A3.
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accountability, and proportionate punishment-and generally,
whether imposing harsh punishment on young offenders ultimately
serves the public interest.' By comparison, whether youths who face
serious legal jeopardy have the developmental capacities to function
adequately as criminal defendants has received little attention.
And yet, even a cursory examination of constitutional doctrine in
this area and its application to the recent reforms make clear that this
issue cannot be ignored. It is well established in American law that a
defendant cannot be subject to criminal adjudication if he is
incompetent to stand trial because he is unable to understand the
charges against him or the nature of the proceedings, or to assist his
attorney in his defense.' The Supreme Court has emphasized that
these requirements are essential for fundamental fairness and are
mandated by the Due Process Clause because they protect the
accuracy and integrity of criminal proceedings.' The conventional
standard by which competence is evaluated focuses on adults'
3. For critiques of recent reforms see generally Elizabeth Scott & Larry Steinberg,
Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799 (2003). See generally THOMAS GRISSO & ROBERT
G. SCHWARTZ, YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE
JUSTICE (2000) (an analysisof juvenile justice from the perspective of developmental
psychologists) [hereinafter YOUTH ON TRIAL]; Elizabeth Scott & Thomas Grisso, The
Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137 (1997) (advocating a continued juvenile justice system
separate from the adjudication of adults, based on lessons from developmental
psychology). For a defense of the reforms, see generally Ralph Rossum, Holding Juveniles
Accountable: Reforming America's "Juvenile Injustice System," 22 PEPP. L. REV. 907
(1995) (supporting efforts to reform the juvenile justice system and advocating for an
enhancement of such efforts); Christine Chamberlin, Note, Not Kids Anymore: A Need
for Punishment and Deterrence in the Juvenile Justice System, 42 B.C. L. REV. 391 (2001)
(supporting a juvenile justice system with blended adult and juvenile sentencing and
automatic transfer of juveniles to adult court in certain cases).
4. This test was announced by the Supreme Court in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S.
402 (1960). See infra note 21 and accompanying text. See generally Gerald Bennett, A
Guided Tour Through Selected ABA Standards Relating to Incompetence to Stand Trial, 53
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 375 (1985) (addressing some of the major issues with the ABA
mental health competence standards); Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal
Defendants with Mental Retardation To Participate in Their Own Defense, 81 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 419 (1990) (critiquing the system of determining the competence of
defendants with mental retardation); Bruce Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand
Trial, 32 UCLA L. REV. 921 (1985) (proposing restructuring the process for determining
adjudicative competence).
5. See generally Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996) (rejecting Oklahoma's
requirement that incompetence be proven under a "clear and convincing evidence"
standard); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975) (finding that the lower court failed to
give proper weight to information suggesting the defendant was incompetent); Pate v.
Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966) (holding that a district court's failure to inquire into an
inmate's competence to stand trial deprived the inmate of his constitutional right to a fair
trial).
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cognitive deficiencies caused by mental illness or mental retardation.6
Beginning in the 1970s, courts and legislatures have extended this
protection to mentally impaired youths adjudicated in juvenile
proceedings. 7 However, few lawmakers have addressed the impact of
developmental immaturity on competence.8
Under contemporary juvenile justice regulation, however, this
issue has become highly salient. Adjudicative competence is a
functional requirement. The constitutional mandate is satisfied if a
defendant has certain capacities that allow her to participate
adequately in the proceedings against her; if she lacks those
capacities, the prosecution cannot go forward.9 Whether the source
of a defendant's incompetence is mental illness or immaturity is not
(or should not be) relevant. Thus, policymakers and courts face a
constitutional imperative to incorporate developmental competence
into the procedural architecture of juvenile justice policy.
This challenge, on first inspection, may seem to be a modest one.
On one level, developmental immaturity is simply an additional basis
(along with mental illness or mental retardation) for invoking a
standard procedural protection available to criminal defendants.
Legislatures and courts can establish procedures by which attorneys
who find their clients too uncomprehending or confused due to
immaturity1" can petition for an evaluation and judicial competence
determination. Viewed in this light, developmental incompetence
represents a modest doctrinal expansion, which carries some urgency
because of the recent punitive reforms.
6. See Pate, 383 U.S. at 376-77; Dusky, 362 U.S. at 403.
7. See Richard E. Redding & Lynda E. Frost, Adjudicative Competence in the
Modern Juvenile Court, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 353, 400-01 (2001) (listing statutes and
case law that require competence hearings for juveniles). In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)
the Supreme Court held that fundamental fairness required that certain procedural
protections be extended to youth during the adjudication stage of a delinquency
proceeding, including the right to counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the
right to confront and cross examine witnesses. Id. at 10. After Gault, the Supreme Court
and state courts considered whether other protections should be extended to juveniles.
See infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. Although the Supreme Court has never
decided whether the competence requirement must be applied in juvenile court, many
state courts have addressed this issue. For a discussion of juvenile competence to stand
trial cases, see infra notes 25-37 and accompanying text.
8. As we discuss in Part I, this is likely because, traditionally, few youths faced adult
jeopardy, and juvenile proceedings were assumed to be tailored to youths.
9. See cases cited supra note 5.
10. Lionel Tate's actions during his trial for murder exemplify this immaturity. As his
lawyer noted, Tate was "sitting here playing with pencil, pen and drawing pictures in
what's probably the most important proceeding of his life." Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 48
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
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The issue is more complex, however. Although immaturity and
mental illness or disability may all produce cognitive and behavioral
deficits that impede trial competence, several distinctive features of
developmental incompetence create major challenges for
policymakers devising juvenile crime policy. Relatively few adult
defendants are found to be incompetent to stand trial, and procedures
for restoration to competence are straightforward and usually
effective. In contrast, powerful research evidence indicates that many
younger adolescents may lack the capacities needed to participate as
defendants in a criminal proceeding. An important study sponsored
by the MacArthur Foundation recently found a high risk of trial
incompetence among younger teens and even mid-adolescents using
the measures applied to adults." This research confirms earlier
studies of youths' capacities in legal settings as well as general
developmental psychology evidence about maturation. 12 It shows that
the risk of developmental incompetence is correlated predictably with
age and concentrated in a readily identified group-younger teens.
In that group, the incidence of developmental incompetence is likely
to be high. Moreover, the conventional remedy for incompetent
defendants, the restoration of competence, may often have little
meaning as applied to youths who have never been competent, and
for whom maturation is the only effective remedy.
Because of these distinctive features, developmental
incompetence poses institutional challenges beyond those raised by
the conventional forms. Even under the most parsimonious account
of the impact of recognizing this construct, the evaluation and
determination of trial competence will play a prominent role in most
criminal prosecutions of younger and mid-adolescents. Beyond this,
lawmakers must also confront the challenge of creating dispositional
remedies that respond to this unique form of incompetence. In
contrast to adults, many immature youths cannot attain competence
through medical or instructional interventions. We will argue that an
efficient disposition for most youths deemed incompetent to proceed
11. See generally Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles' Competence to Stand Trial: A
Comparison of Adolescents' and Adults' Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 333 (2003) (summarizing the MacArthur Study). In the MacArthur study, which
included 1393 subjects from ages eleven to twenty-four, almost one-third of youths aged
eleven to thirteen years and nineteen percent of fourteen- and fifteen-year-olds performed
as poorly on adjudicative competence measures as adults who are found to be
incompetent to stand trial, whereas sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds performed much like
adults. See discussion infra Part II.C. The study did not measure or reach conclusions
about trial incompetence per se, as that is a legal judgment.
12. This research is described infra Part II.
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in criminal court is adjudication in a juvenile delinquency proceeding.
This implies, of course, that the competence requirements in
delinquency proceedings must be less demanding than those applied
to criminal trials. 3 A less demanding juvenile court standard avoids
an institutional crisis that would arise if a unitary standard were
applied to juvenile and criminal proceedings; under such a regime, a
sizeable group of younger teens might be immune from prosecution
in any court, whereas under the dual standard regime that we
propose, most youths could be adjudicated and subject to juvenile
dispositions. Our analysis demonstrates that dual competence
standards are compatible with fundamental fairness as required by
the Due Process Clause. 4
An important caveat is in order here. The adoption of a less
demanding competence standard can be constitutionally justified only
if the punishment stakes in delinquency proceedings are lower than
those facing criminal defendants and the objectives of juvenile justice
policy are broader than punishment. These constraints challenge the
recent reforms creating more punitive juvenile court dispositions, at
least as applied to those teens who are incompetent under adult
standards.15
A road map of the Article may be useful. Part I describes the
legal and constitutional landscape of the trial competence
requirement and how it has been applied to juveniles. We explain
how the issue of developmental competence emerged only in the
context of the recent punitive reforms in juvenile justice policy and
why this construct must be incorporated into legal doctrine. Part II
examines the scientific evidence regarding the link between
immaturity and incompetence. We describe the developmental
psychology knowledge about adolescent capacities that are related to
trial performance, as well as research evidence on adjudicative
competence among juveniles. Part III examines the implications of
this research for legal policy, exploring both the threshold importance
of adjudicative competence for assuring fundamental fairness in
criminal and delinquency proceedings as well as the implications for
13. Otherwise youths who are incompetent to stand trial as adults also could not
participate in delinquency proceedings.
14. See discussion infra Part III.B.
15. For example, in many jurisdictions today, juvenile court sentences extend into
adulthood, and juvenile court convictions are used in adult sentencing determinations. See
Richard E. Redding & James C. Howell, Blended Sentencing in American Juvenile Courts,
in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 145 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E.





I. APPLYING THE TRIAL COMPETENCE REQUIREMENT TO
JUVENILES: A DOCTRINAL HISTORY
In this Part, we briefly describe the legal and constitutional
mandate that defendants must be competent to stand trial and then
turn to its application to juvenile defendants. The latter account has
unfolded against the backdrop of evolving juvenile justice policy over
several decades. The issue of adjudicative competence simply was
not deemed relevant in traditional juvenile delinquency proceedings.
Competence doctrine was introduced into this setting beginning in
the 1970s, after the Supreme Court announced in In re Gault16 that
juvenile defendants were entitled to many of the procedural
protections provided to adults in criminal trials.17 During the post-
Gault period, the competence inquiry focused on the incapacities of
mentally ill or retarded youths. However, beginning in the late 1980s,
dramatic reforms in juvenile justice policy have resulted in the
institutional challenge the justice system faces today-that of meeting
the constitutional mandate in an era when many young defendants
facing serious legal jeopardy may be incompetent due to immaturity.
A. The Legal and Constitutional Requirements of Competence To
Stand Trial
The procedural requirement that criminal defendants must be
competent to stand trial has long been established as a mechanism to
assure that minimum standards of fairness are met in criminal
proceedings.18 The requirement originally served a rather formalistic
function. A criminal trial could proceed only after the defendant
entered a plea; thus, adjudication was barred if a defendant's
disability prevented him from entering a plea, but not if he was "mute
of malice." 19 The doctrine evolved to focus on defendants' capacities
to understand the proceedings and the charges against them, and to
assist counsel in offering a defense; those whose mental disabilities
precluded effective participation could not be tried. This
contemporary understanding is captured in the federal standard
announced by the Supreme Court in Dusky v. United States,2" which
16. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
17. Id. at 10.
18. Richard J. Bonnie & Thomas Grisso, Adjudicative Competence and Youthful
Offenders, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 3, at 73,74.
19. Id. at 74.
20. 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
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has since been adopted uniformly by American courts. Under Dusky,
the competence determination focuses on "whether [the defendant]
has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against
him."'
It is generally agreed that the requirement of trial competence
serves three independent functions. First, it preserves the integrity of
criminal trials, which would be undermined if a mentally impaired
and uncomprehending defendant faced the power of the accusing
state in a proceeding in which his liberty is at stake. Second, the
requirement reduces error and promotes the accuracy of the
proceedings. Again because of the high stakes, error in criminal
proceedings that could result in a wrongful conviction undermines
basic fairness. An incompetent defendant may be unable to challenge
prosecution evidence or to offer exculpatory information. She may
also be disabled from raising defenses that an individual with better
comprehension could assert. Finally, the competence requirement
safeguards defendants' autonomy-based interest in meaningful
participation in criminal proceedings-and thus protects a core value
underlying due process in this setting.22 In Pate v. Robinson,23 the
Supreme Court affirmed the constitutional importance of this
requirement, holding that the Due Process Clause requires that
criminal defendants must be competent to stand trial.2 4
B. Trial Competence of Juveniles
1. The Incorporation of the Competence Requirement in
Delinquency Proceedings
The requirement that criminal defendants be competent to stand
trail had no place in delinquency proceedings in the traditional
juvenile court. In a system in which the government's announced
purpose was to rehabilitate and not to punish errant youths, the
procedural protections accorded adult defendants-including the
21. Id. at 402.
22. Bruce J. Winick, Restructuring Competency To Stand Trial, 32 UCLA L. REV. 921,
950 (1985) ("[T]he incompetency doctrine ... has been characterized by the Supreme
Court as 'fundamental to an adversary system of justice.' As a result, the doctrine is
widely regarded as being compelled by due process considerations." (quoting Drope v.
Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975))); see also Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 18, at 76.
23. 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
24. Id. at 378.
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requirement of adjudicative competence-were deemed
unnecessary. 5 This all changed with In re Gault, which led to an
extensive restructuring of delinquency proceedings to conform to the
requirements of constitutional due process.26 Although the Supreme
Court has never considered whether due process requires that
defendants in juvenile delinquency proceedings be competent to
stand trial, many state courts have addressed this issue. Almost all
have held that the requirements of due process and fair treatment can
be satisfied in juvenile delinquency proceedings only if defendants are
competent to stand trial.27
Courts addressing this issue generally have not offered extensive
analysis of why the requirement of trial competence should apply to
delinquency proceedings. As a general matter, courts note the quasi-
criminal nature of these proceedings and the potential loss of liberty
that can result from adjudication. Some courts have found the
requirement of adjudicative competence to be important because
other procedural rights accorded to juvenile defendants would have
little value if the defendant were incompetent. 8 Most important,
perhaps, the value of the right to counsel is thought to be greatly
25. Judge Ben Lindsey of the Denver Juvenile Court was an outspoken early
advocate of informal delinquency proceedings. See BEN B. LINDSEY & HARVEY J.
O'HIGGINS, THE BEAST 133 (University of Washington Press 1970) (1910) (arguing that
the privilege against self incrimination has no place in a juvenile delinquency proceeding
because young offenders should confess their wrongdoing).
26. Gault extended several procedural rights to juveniles in the adjudication stage of
delinquency proceedings-the right to counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination, the
right of confrontation and the right to notice of the charges. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 33, 41,
55-56. In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), the Court held that proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is required in delinquency proceedings. Id. at 368; see also Breed v.
Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528 (1975) (holding that juveniles were protected against double
jeopardy). Nonetheless, the Court has made clear that not all constitutional protections
accorded to criminal defendants are required in juvenile delinquency proceedings. See
infra note 33.
27. See Ex parte Brown, 540 So. 2d 740, 744-45 (Ala. 1989); State ex rel. Dandoy v.
Superior Court, 619 P.2d 12, 15 (Ariz. 1980); Golden v. State, 21 S.W.3d 801, 802-803
(Ark. 2000); James v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. Rptr. 398, 400-401 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978); In
re W.A.F., 573 A.2d 1264, 1265-66 (D.C. 1990); In re S.H., 469 S.E.2d 810, 811-12 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1996); In re T.D.W., 441 N.E.2d 155, 157 (I11. App. Ct. 1982); In re K.G., 808 N.E.2d
631, 635 (Ind. 2004); State v. Kempf, 282 N.W.2d 704, 706-707 (Iowa 1979); State ex rel.
Causey, 363 So. 2d 472, 475-76 (La. 1978); In re Carey 615 N.W.2d 742, 747 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2000); In re S.W.T.' s Welfare, 277 N.W.2d 507, 511 (Minn. 1979); Matter of Two
Minor Children, 592 P.2d 166, 170 (Nev. 1979); In re Williams, 687 N.E.2d 507, 510-11
(Ohio Ct. App. 1997); In re J.M., 769 A.2d 656, 662 (Vt. 2001); State v. E.C., 922 P.2d 152,
154 (Wa~h. Ct. App. 1996). An exception is the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals,
which found that adjudicative competence is not constitutionally required. G.J.I. v. State,
778 P.2d 485,487 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989).
28. See, e.g., In re S.H., 469 S.E.2d at 811.
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diminished if the youth cannot communicate with her attorney or is
unaware of the nature of the proceedings due to mental illness or
disability.29 Other courts emphasize that the value of accuracy, which
is promoted by requiring that defendants be capable of assisting
counsel, is compatible with the purposes of juvenile delinquency
proceedings. 0
Courts incorporating the adjudicative, competence requirement
into delinquency proceedings have assumed that the incapacities of
incompetent juveniles are analogous to those of their adult
counterparts: the cases have almost exclusively involved youths who
are mentally ill or mentally retarded.31 Although a few courts have
suggested in passing that immaturity might exaggerate the challenges
faced by incompetent youths,32 developmental incompetence per se
has received little attention in the case law.
On reflection, this is not surprising. The project undertaken by
post-Gault courts was to examine discrete legal protections enjoyed
by criminal defendants to determine whether they should be
incorporated into delinquency proceedings.33 Since adjudicative
competence doctrine almost exclusively focused on mental illness and
disability as sources of incompetence, 34  courts extending this
protection to juveniles were seldom confronted with the issue of
29. See Golden, 21 S.W.3d at 803; In re K.G., 808 N.E.2d at 635; In re Carey, 615
N.W.2d at 746.
30. See In re W.A.F., 573 A.2d at 1267.
31. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. All of these cases involved mentally ill
or disabled youths, although a few were also very young. See Golden, 21 S.W.3d at 801
(involving an eleven-year-old defendant); In re K.G., 808 N.E.2d at 632 (involving a ten-
year-old, an eleven-year-old, and a twelve-year-old defendant); W.S.L. v. State, 470 So. 2d
828, 828 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (involving a nine-year-old defendant); In re S.H., 469
S.E.2d at 810 (involving a twelve-year-old defendant).
32. See In re Carey, 615 N.W.2d at 748; Causey, 363 So. 2d at 476. Even in these cases,
however, the petitioners claimed incompetence on the basis of disability and not
immaturity.
33. See supra note 25. Sometimes the Court concluded that procedural rights
accorded adults should not be extended to juvenile delinquency proceedings. See
generally Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) (involving right to bail); McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (involving right to a trial by jury).
34. Some cases have focused on physical conditions that could impair competence.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana discussed seven factors to consider when determining
whether a physical condition impairs competence. State v. Karno, 342 So. 2d 219, 222-23
(La. 1977); see also State v. Richardson, 330 N.C. 174, 179-80, 410 S.E.2d 61, 64 (1991)
(addressing defendant's claim that his absence from trial was the result of back problems);
State v. Ortiz, 571 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (including physical ailments in
defendant's claim of incompetence); Compton v. State, 500 S.W.2d 131, 133 (Tex. Crim.




incompetence solely based on immaturity. More importantly, the
underlying rationale for maintaining a separate system for the
adjudication and correction of juveniles is that young offenders,
because of their immaturity, warranted differential treatment. Thus,
the idea that immaturity should be a basis for disqualification from
adjudication in juvenile court understandably might have seemed
incoherent, or at least incompatible with the rationale for the system.
The post-Gault legal developments took place in a context in which
courts, even as they incorporated adult rights, continued to assume
that the juvenile court was very different from the criminal justice
system in its purposes and in the severity of its sanctions. Courts
considering due process claims emphasized these differences, at least
rhetorically, and evaluated procedural protections in part on the basis
of their compatibility with the unique purposes and character of the
juvenile court.35  Thus, it is understandable that delinquency
jurisdiction was assumed to extend to youths charged with crimes,
without regard to their immaturity.
In concluding that trial competence is required in delinquency
proceedings, courts divided on the competence standard to be
applied. Some courts assumed that the Dusky standard should simply
be incorporated into delinquency proceedings, while others were less
clear about the standard to be applied, emphasizing that juveniles
should be assessed by "juvenile rather than adult norms."36 Although
35. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 536-37 (1975); McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 665. For
example, Justice White has written that:
To the extent that the jury is a buffer to the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor in
the criminal law system, the distinctive intake policies and procedures of the
juvenile court system to a great extent obviate this important function of the jury.
As for the necessity to guard against judicial bias, a system eschewing
blameworthiness and punishment for evil choice is itself an operative force against
prejudice and short-tempered justice. Nor where juveniles are involved is there
the same opportunity for corruption to the juvenile's detriment or the same
temptation to use the courts for political ends.
McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 665 (White, J., concurring). This assumption is clear in opinions
dealing with competence to stand trial as well. For example, one court has noted that:
We disagree with our colleagues, however, on the applicability of the adult
competency statute. The juvenile court system is founded on the notion of parens
patriae, which allows the court the power to step into the shoes of the parents....
Adopted by American common law, the parens patriae doctrine gives juvenile
courts power to further the best interests of the child, which implies a broad
discretion unknown in the adult criminal court system.
In re K. G., 808 N.E.2d at 635-36.
36. State v. Settles, No. 13-97-50, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 4973, at *9 (Ohio Ct. App.
Sept. 30, 1998).
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little elaboration of the meaning of "juvenile norms" was offered,
these courts stressed that youths in juvenile delinquency proceedings
cannot be expected to have the same level of comprehension as
adults, and that a lower standard of competence applies to these
proceedings.37 This approach amounts to an implicit recognition that
the distinctive purposes of the juvenile court may warrant less
exacting procedural requirements.
2. The Criminal Adjudication of Youths
Both before and after Gault, youths were occasionally
transferred to criminal court and tried and punished as adults. Even
in this context, the doctrine prohibiting the adjudication of
incompetent defendants has not been adapted in most states to
exclude immature youths from criminal prosecution. Under a few
statutes, courts conducting transfer hearings are expressly directed to
consider whether the youth's immaturity would render her unable to
participate in a criminal proceeding.38 More indirectly, courts
evaluating amenability to treatment in the juvenile system, a factor in
the transfer decision under most statutes, likely consider generally the
developmental immaturity of the youth, although not focusing
explicitly on trial competence. In this way, courts almost
inadvertently might exclude immature youths from criminal
adjudication, but with no explicit evaluation of trial competence.
Similarly, little evidence suggests that criminal courts ordered
competence evaluations on the basis of immaturity after transfer.39 In
part, this may not be surprising when it is remembered that, until the
1990s, immature youths generally were not subject to adult criminal
proceedings because younger adolescents could not be transferred
under most statutes. Thus, the occasional sixteen- or seventeen-year-
old criminal defendants may not have raised concerns about trial
competence, because they were mature enough to participate
adequately in the proceedings.
37. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the decision of a trial court that
competence was not relevant in a delinquency proceeding in a case involving a youth
whose IQ was assessed at 52. People v. Carey, 615 N.W.2d 742, 748 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000).
The court stated that "[a] juvenile need not be found incompetent just because, under
adult standards, the juvenile would be found incompetent in a criminal proceeding." Id.
38. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1(3) (Michie 2003).
39. A rare appellate opinion dealing with a competence evaluation based on
immaturity involved a nine-year-old defendant convicted of first degree murder. W.S.L. v.
Florida, 470 So. 2d 828, 829 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). The appellate court directed a
competence evaluation because the defendant may have been incompetent due to his "age
and intellect." Id. at 830.
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In sum, until the 1990s, the issue of the trial competence of
juveniles involved a straightforward doctrinal exercise of
incorporating a procedural protection that is relevant to a relatively
small number of impaired adult defendants into delinquency
proceedings, where it was assumed also to protect a small number of
mentally ill* or disabled youths. Thus, the adjudicative competence
requirement had a modest institutional impact on delinquency
proceedings. The issue of developmental incompetence simply did
not become salient during this period either in juvenile court, which
was established to deal with a population of immature lawbreakers,
or in criminal court, because those youths who were tried as adults
tended to be older adolescents."n Although the introduction of this
procedural requirement created some challenges for the juvenile
system, which often lacked the statutory procedures and institutional
mechanisms for dealing with youths found to be incompetent,4 1 these
challenges were generally modest.
C. The Punitive Juvenile Justice Reforms
The punitive reforms of juvenile justice policy that began in the
late 1980s destabilized this equilibrium by increasing the punishment
stakes facing many young offenders and eroding the boundary
between the adult and juvenile systems. We will show how these
legal developments unwittingly have transformed adjudicative
40. In 1985, six percent of juveniles waived to a criminal court were under sixteen
years old. JEFFREY A. BuTrs, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DELINQUENCY CASES WAIVED
TO CRIMINAL COURT, 1985-1994 1 (1997). By 1999, fourteen percent of a larger cohort of
juveniles waived were under sixteen years old. CHARLES M. PUZZANCHERA, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, DELINQUENCY CASES WAIVED TO CRIMINAL COURT, 1990-1999 2 (2003).
41. In a Georgia case, the lower court had found the defendant incompetent but
continued the trial because "Georgia law does not provide a statutory framework in order
to protect juveniles [sic] rights not to be tried in a delinquency proceeding while they are
incompetent." In re S.H., 469 S.E.2d 810, 810 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). Most courts have held
that adult procedures are to be applied in the juvenile courts. See, e.g., In re W.A.F., 573
A.2d 1264, 1267 (D.C. 1990) ("[W]e hold that the determination of mental competency of
a juvenile is one of those instances where the procedure followed in adult criminal
prosecutions must be applied to juvenile delinquency proceedings."). However, upholding
the requirement of competence to stand trial in delinquency proceedings the Supreme
Court of Indiana concluded that the adult dispositional procedures under the statute did
not apply to juveniles. See In re K.G., 808 N.E.2d 631, 639 (Ind. 2004). The court noted a
lack of appropriate space available for juveniles:
In addition to the lack of adequate facilities or programs, because of the physical
location of these state run facilities, a juvenile committed to the division of mental
health under the auspices of the adult competency statute could be confined in an
institution hundreds of miles from home and family.
Id. at 638.
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competence from a minor procedural reform in delinquency
proceedings into a major institutional challenge and introduced
developmental incompetence as a construct that demands attention.
The history of the recent reforms is familiar. Responding to an
increase in the rate of violent juvenile crime in the late 1980s and
early 1990s,42 advocates for tougher policies argued that young
criminals represented a serious threat to public safety that could only
be contained if they were punished as adults.43 Disenchantment with
the juvenile court also played a role, with critics claiming that
excessive leniency toward young offenders contributed to the youth
crime problem." To be sure, the reforms generated controversy.
Some observers argued that adult punishment was likely to diminish
the prospects for productive adulthood in youths who might
42. The juvenile crime rate peaked in 1993; it declined during the second half of the
1990s. See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 3 at 807-08. In 2000, "the serious violent crime
offending rate was 17 crimes per 1,000 juveniles ages 12 to 17 ... a 67 percent drop from
the 1993 high and the lowest recorded since the national victimization survey began in
1973." FED. INTERAGENCY FORUM ON CHILD AND FAMILY STATISTICS, AMERICA'S
CHILDREN: KEY NATIONAL INDICATORS OF WELL-BEING 2003 45. However, punitive
reforms have continued apace, despite the decline in juvenile crime since the mid-1990s.
In 2000, California voters approved Proposition 21, or the Gang Violence and Juvenile
Crime Prevention Act, which "made fifteen changes to the Penal Code which focus on
gang-related crimes committed by adults" and "seventeen substantial changes to the
Welfare and Institutions Code, all of which focus on the violent quality of crime
perpetrated by juveniles and impose harsher punishment." Sara Raymond, From
Playpens to Prisons: What the Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act of 1998
Does to California's Juvenile Justice System and Reasons To Repeal It, 30 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REV. 233, 234 (2000). One notable provision amended a California statute so that
anyone who is at least fourteen years old and commits murder or sexual assault is
transferred to criminal court. Id. at 255 (citing CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602 (West
2003 & Supp. 2004)). Previously the statute required the juvenile be sixteen and have
previously been found a ward of the court. Id. at 256.
43. Advocates for tougher policies argue that:
Urban criminals who end up in prison typically start out young and commit dozens
of crimes before they get their first ticket to the big house. Restraining these
chronic youth offenders early in their careers rather than waiting until they have
found their umpteenth victims is not only a boost to public safety, but a blow for
morality and justice.
John J. Dilulio et al., How To Deal with the Youth Crime Wave, WKLY. STANDARD, Sept.
16, 1996, at 30.
44. As one critic put it,
The juvenile courts fail to teach juveniles that they will be held responsible for
their criminal acts; that the more serious and frequent their acts, the more
responsible they will be held; and that the older they are, the more responsible
they will be expected to be. As a consequence, serious juvenile crime is soaring
while the public's confidence in juvenile justice is plummeting.
Rossum, supra note 3, at 925-26.
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otherwise outgrow their criminal tendencies; others challenged the
reforms as illegitimate on proportionality grounds, for holding youths
to adult standards of criminal responsibility." The overriding
political sentiment, however, was captured in the slogan, "Adult time
for adult crime. "46
The reforms are embodied in several legislative strategies under
which juveniles facing criminal charges increasingly have been treated
like their adult counterparts. First, the age at which a juvenile can be
subject to criminal proceedings has been lowered in most states, such
that in many jurisdictions, pre-teens can be tried as adults and
sentenced to prison.47 Moreover, the range of felonies that can result
in adult prosecution has been substantially broadened to include not
only serious violent crimes, but also less serious felonies, particularly
drug crimes. 8 Under legislative waiver statutes, criminal court
jurisdiction is triggered automatically, based solely on the youth's age
and the offense, with no individualized evaluation of amenability to
treatment or immaturity.49 Finally, in some states, prosecutors have
substantial discretion to decide without judicial approval whether
youths will be adjudicated in juvenile or criminal court.5
45. For a discussion of critiques, see supra note 3; see generally Thomas Grisso,
Society's Retributive Response to Juvenile Violence: A Developmental Perspective, 20 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 229 (1996) (arguing for legal consequences for adolescents that differ from
punishment given to adults).
46. The origin of this frequently quoted statement is uncertain. See Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, Youthful Indiscretions: Culture, Class Status, and the Passage to Adulthood,
51 DEPAUL L. REV. 743,744 (2002) (quoting, but not endorsing, the slogan).
47. In many states, the age of criminal prosecution for homicide is twelve or even
younger. For other felonies, the minimum age may be a year or two older. Today, the
mode minimum age of adult prosecution is probably age thirteen or fourteen, whereas a
generation ago it was age fifteen or sixteen. For a recent summary of state laws, see
MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILES IN COURT 6-10 (2003).
48. For example, Wisconsin allows the prosecutor to request a transfer when the
juvenile is at least fourteen and is accused of felony murder, homicide, sexual assault,
taking hostages, kidnapping, burglary, robbery, and drug offenses. WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 938.18 (West 2003 & Supp. 2004). In Vermont, the list of offenses that allow the state to
transfer a juvenile between ten and fourteen include arson, murder, manslaughter,
kidnapping, unlawful restraint, maiming, sexual assault, assault and robbery, and burglary.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5506(a) (2003).
49. See SICKMUND, supra note 47, at 10. For examples of these statutes, see ALA.
CODE § 12-15-34.1 (2003 & Supp. 2004); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-501 (2004); CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 602 (West 2003 & Supp. 2004); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6355
(West 2003 & Supp. 2004). Prosecutorial discretion remains, such that the type of crime
with which the youth is charged may determine whether she is tried as an adult or as a
juvenile. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-130(1)(a) (2004) (excluding from
definition of delinquent minor any youth age fifteen or more charged with specified
crimes).
50. See SICKMUND, supra note 47, at 9. For example, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-
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Lawmakers have also responded to criticism of the juvenile
system by narrowing the gap between juvenile court dispositions and
criminal sentences. Dispositional jurisdiction for serious crimes has
been extended into adulthood in many states, and others have
introduced blended sentences completed in adult prison. 1 Moreover,
whereas juvenile crimes were viewed traditionally as the mistakes of
wayward youth and records were sealed, today youthful
transgressions carry adult consequences. Juvenile convictions can be
considered in adult sentencing, and can count under three-strikes
laws.5' In some states, juveniles who commit sex offenses against
minors are subject to statutory registration requirements, under
which they are permanently labeled and publicly identified as sex
offenders.53
104(5) (West 2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.227 (West 2003 & Supp. 2005); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 41-5-206 (2003).
51. One scholar explains that:
The concept of extended juvenile jurisdiction, and its corollary, blended
sentencing, allows the juvenile court judge to impose both a juvenile disposition
and an adult sentence when a juvenile is found to have committed a serious
offense. The adult sentence is stayed until the completion of the terms of the
juvenile disposition.... Because the adult sentence is only imposed after the
juvenile disposition, rehabilitation which occurs before that point, makes release
from custody possible. On the other hand, if the juvenile violates the terms of the
disposition or commits another offense, the adult sentence is implemented without
the need for additional court proceedings.
Chauncey E. Brummer, Extended Juvenile Jurisdiction: The Best of Both Worlds?, 54
ARK. L. REV. 777, 778-79 (2002). For examples of blended sentencing statutes, see CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-133c (West 2003 & Supp. 2004); IOWA CODE ANN. § 90 7.3A
(West 2003 & Supp. 2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 58 (West 2004); TEx. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 54.04 (Vernon 2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-272 (Michie 2003).
52. See PATRICIA TORBET & LINDA SZYMANSKI, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME: 1996-97 UPDATE 8-12 (1998)
(describing trend of opening juvenile court records); id. at 13 (describing use of juvenile
record in adult sentencing); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d)(3) (West 2003 & Supp.
2005) (determining if juvenile offenses constitute a prior felony for purposes of sentencing
enhancement).
53. TORBET & SZYMANSKI, supra note 52, at 13. "Megan's Law" statues were
inspired by the outrage following the rape and murder of Megan Kanka by her neighbor in
a New Jersey suburb. Joseph F. Sullivan, Whitman Approves Stringent Restrictions on Sex
Criminals, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1994, at B1. Statutory changes ensured that sex offenders
would be required to register with the local police department and the community would
be notified about that sex offender. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 to 7-19 (West Supp. 2004).
Recently, many states have made this information easily accessible via the Internet. For
example, the Virginia State Police allow anyone to search their registry. See Sex Offender
and Crimes Against Minors Registry, at http://sex-offender.vsp.state.va.us (last visited Jan.
13, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). For a discussion of the
application of these statutes to juveniles, see generally TORBET & SZYMANSKI, supra note
52. Some experts challenge the inclusion of juveniles under these statutes on the ground
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As legislatures across the country enacted laws that dramatically
altered the landscape of juvenile crime policy, the procedural issue of
whether youngsters charged with crimes might be less able to
participate in criminal proceedings than adult defendants was not
central to the policy debates. Nor, for the most part, was it
considered by legislatures toughening sanctions in juvenile court.5 4
This is perhaps not surprising; as we have suggested, courts
traditionally did not think of immaturity as a basis of trial
incompetence, because youths (especially younger teens) were tried
in juvenile court, a context that was presumed to be appropriately
adapted to deal with this population.
Given that developmental incompetence has largely escaped the
attention of courts and policymakers, it is worth asking directly
whether the constitutional prohibition against criminal adjudication
of incompetent defendants must be applied to this form of incapacity.
The answer is surely "yes." The competence requirement is
functional at its core, as it is directed toward particular purposes that
are important in a criminal proceeding because the defendant's
liberty is at stake. The requirement exists to protect the integrity of
the proceedings, reduce error, and promote meaningful participation
by the defendant. These purposes embody the underlying
commitment to fair proceedings that is the essence of due process,
and they are undermined when a defendant is incompetent, whatever
the source of that defendant's incapacity.5 Thus, the policy concerns
that support the requirement of trial competence on the basis of
mental illness or disability are implicated to the same extent when
immature youths are subject to criminal proceedings.
The issue of developmental incompetence began to surface as
reform policies were implemented and increasing numbers of
immature youths faced prosecution in criminal court. The story of
thirteen-year-old Lionel Tate focused national attention on the issue:
that juvenile sex crimes are often peculiarly linked to adolescent sexual development and
differ in important ways from sex crimes by adults. See FRANKLIN ZIMRING, AN
AMERICAN TRAVESTY: LEGAL RESPONSES TO ADOLESCENT SEXUAL OFFENDING 63-
68 (2004).
54. An exception is the enactment of the Arkansas statute, under which a juvenile
under the age of thirteen can receive extended juvenile jurisdiction or blended sentencing
if she commits capital murder or first degree murder. The statute presumes those under
the age of thirteen are incompetent to stand trial and requires the prosecution to
overcome this presumption by a preponderance of the evidence. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-
502(b) (Michie 2003).
55. Courts have recognized the functional nature of the competence requirement in
barring adjudication in the rare instances when defendants are incompetent due to a
medical condition. See supra note 34.
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Lionel rejected the state's generous plea offer against his attorney's
advice and ultimately received a life sentence from the jury. 6 The
unease expressed by many observers about Lionel's prosecution and
conviction reflected, at least in part, a concern that the youth lacked
the maturity to comprehend the stakes he faced or the consequences
of his choice.57 This case highlights a dilemma that now confronts
policymakers-how to respond to the reality that immature youths
may simply be less capable trial participants than adults and that
some portion may be unable to adequately comprehend the meaning
and consequences of criminal proceedings or to assist their attorneys
in their defense.58
The punitive reforms present a more subtle challenge in the
context of delinquency proceedings. Courts extending the
competence requirement to delinquency proceedings in the post-
Gault period did not focus on the immaturity of juveniles; indeed, as
we have suggested, this provided the premise for maintaining a
separate justice system. However, when adult sanctions are imposed
in juvenile court, any distinction from a criminal proceeding
evaporates and developmental incapacity becomes as important in
this setting as it is in a criminal proceeding. Under some modern
statutes, a twelve-year-old can face a twenty year sentence on
homicide charges in a delinquency proceeding. 9 In this situation, his
capacity to comprehend the jeopardy he faces and to assist his
56. For a description of Lionel's lack of comprehension during the trial, see supra
note 10.
57. Lionel's case suggests the complexity of the ways that youthful immaturity can
impede competence. Lionel rejected his attorney's advice that he accept the plea offer at
the urging of his mother, who rejected any suggestion of culpability on Lionel's part. See
Dana Canedy, Sentence of Life Without Parole for Boy, 14, in Murder of Girl, 6, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2001, at Al ("Ms. Grossett-Tate ... told Judge Lazarus before the
sentencing that Tiffany's death was an accident and so she could not let her son plead
guilty to homicide."). A more mature defendant than Lionel might have been better
situated to assess his options with the aid of his attorney, free of undue influence by his
mother, and to make a self-interested decision. Even the prosecutor expressed discomfort
at the sentence of life imprisonment for a crime committed when Lionel was twelve. See
Anne Hull, Life Without Parole for Boy, 14, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2001, at Al (noting
that the prosecutor was joining defendant's clemency plea for reduction of the sentence).
58. David Tanenhaus and Steven Drizin have examined the costly consequences of
immaturity in the interrogation setting. See David S. Tanenhaus & Steven A. Drizin,
"Owing to the Extreme Youth of the Accused": The Changing Legal Response to Juvenile
Homicide, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 641, 677-78, n.150 (2002) (describing the risk
of interrogating young children, who are far more likely than adults to give false
confessions; in the case of victim Ryan Harris, two young boys were erroneously accused
of rape and murder).
59. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 58 (West 2004). Generally, under blended
sentencing regimes, youths can serve long sentences in adult prisons. See supra note 51.
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attorney is as important as it would be in a criminal trial.
II. ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT AND TRIAL COMPETENCE
In this Part, we examine the scientific basis of the construct of
developmental incompetence. We begin by describing generally the
developmental status of pre-teens and adolescents which clarifies
important dimensions of psychological immaturity. This account,
based on recent research, supports conventional intuitions that
adolescents are less mature than adults. We then translate the legal
criteria for competence to stand trial into specific abilities expected of
the competent defendant. Finally, we will describe recent research
that links scientific knowledge about youths' developmental status to
capacities needed for trial participation. The analysis concludes that
youths below age sixteen are significantly more likely than are adults
to have deficiencies in capacities necessary for competent
participation in criminal proceedings, and that, below age fourteen,
the risk is substantial.
A. Psychological Development in Adolescence
Lawmakers usually define immaturity through bright line rules
that establish the legal boundaries between childhood and adulthood
for various purposes on the basis of age. 6  These boundaries are
based partly on crude judgments about psychological development
and partly on other policy concerns.61  From a developmental
perspective, age is a convenient but imprecise marker of the
maturation process.62 Thus, in creating (and evaluating) optimal legal
age categories, the first step is to examine psychological development
in the domains relevant to the legal task.
Four spheres of development-neurological, intellectual,
emotional and psycho-social-affect the capacities of individuals to
understand information and make decisions. In recent years,
developmental research has enhanced our understanding of
60. See Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 547, 548 (2000) (describing the bases of legal age boundaries and arguing that, "for
the most part, the regime of crude bright line rules operates efficiently").
61. For example, youths age sixteen can obtain driver licenses in most states, but
cannot purchase alcohol until age twenty-one. This is justified as a means to limit drinking
and driving by young individuals, which protects young drivers from their own immature
judgment and also protects public safety. Id. at 547-48.
62. This is so in part because individuals vary a great deal in their developmental
course, such that some twelve-year-olds may be more mature than many fifteen-year-olds
in general or in specific domains. It is also due to variation in the pace of development in
different spheres. See infra note 84.
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adolescent development in these spheres, confirming what parents
know from experience-that adolescents are in the process of
developing adult capabilities, but they have not attained maturity.
1. Neurological Development
Neuroscience research on adolescent brain functioning, which
probes the biological basis of psychological development, is a recent
development; only in the past decade have scientists learned that
brain development continues through adolescence.63  This
neurological development is especially evident in the early adolescent
years, although it continues more slowly through middle
adolescence.' One of the last areas of the brain to develop is the
prefrontal cortex, which functions as a center for "executive cognitive
functions" such as planning, organizing information, and thinking
about possible consequences of action.65 Another important function
of the prefrontal cortex is "affect regulation"-the capacity to inhibit
or delay impulsive and emotional reactions sufficiently to allow for
rational consideration of appropriate responses.6   Development of
the pre-frontal cortex and of connections from this area to other
regions of the brain continues through adolescence.
63. This research uses magnetic resonance imaging of the brains of individuals at
various ages. See, e.g., Jay N. Giedd et al., Brain Development During Childhood and
Adolescence: A Longitudinal MRI Study, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 861 (1999)
(demonstrating "nonlinear changes in cortical gray matter with a preadolescent increase
followed by a post-adolescent decrease"); Nitin Gogtay et al., Dynamic Mapping of
Human Cortical Development During Childhood Through Early Adulthood, 101 PROC.
NAT'L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 8174 (2004) (reporting dynamic anatomical sequence of human
cortical gray matter development between ages four and twenty-one); Elizabeth R. Sowell
et al., Localizing Age-Related Change in Brain Structure Between Childhood and
Adolescence Using Statistical Parametric Mapping, 9 NEUROIMAGE 587 (1999) (examining
spatial location of changes in dorsal cortices of frontal and parietal lobes). These changes
include continued growth of sheaths on neurons that improve their conductive efficiency
(called "myelination") and the streamlining of neural connections so that transmissions
are more efficient and less random (called "pruning"). Brain development stabilizes in
later adolescence. Giedd, et al., supra at 861-62. For a description of the research of
brain development in adolescence and its relevance to criminal behavior, see generally
Mary Beckman, Crime, Culpability and the Adolescent Brain, 305 ScI. 596 (July 2004).
64. Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., Mapping Continued Brain Growth and Gray Matter
Density Reduction in Dorsal Frontal Cortex: Inverse Relationships During Postadolescent
Brain Maturation, 21 J. NEUROSCIENCE 8819, 8821 (2001).
65. See ELKHONON GOLDBERG, THE EXECUTIVE BRAIN: FRONTAL LOBES AND
THE CIVILIZED MIND 35 (2001); Gogtay, supra note 63, at 8174.
66. Marsel Mesulam, Behavioral Neuroanatomy, in PRINCIPLES OF BEHAVIORAL
AND COGNITIVE NEUROLOGY 1, 47 (Marsel Mesulam ed., 2d. ed. 2000); Peter R.
Giancola et al., Executive Cognitive Functioning and Aggressive Behavior in Preadolescent




Youths in early and mid-adolescence generally are neurologically
immature. Their brains are "unstable";67 they have not yet attained
their adult neurological potential to respond effectively to situations
that require careful or reasoned decisions and they may be more
inclined than adults to act impulsively and without planning. The
upshot is that the recent neurological research reveals that
psychological immaturity in adolescents (to which we now turn) likely
has a basis in biology.
2. Intellectual Development
Cognitive development during adolescence has been the focus of
scientific interest for many years and is now well documented.
Intellectual capacities increase in childhood and into adolescence;
although there is much variability among individuals, children and
younger teens differ significantly from adults in their cognitive
functioning. In part, this is simply because adults have more
extensive experience. As youths enter and proceed through
adolescence, they acquire new information through experience and
education, and "practice" their cognitive abilities in a broader range
of contexts.68  Beyond the accumulation of knowledge and
experience, intellectual development in adolescence also involves
improvements in basic information processing skills, including
organization, attention and short and long term memory. Early
adolescence is characterized by gains in deductive reasoning and
abstract thinking, including the ability to think about hypothetical
situations and to consider that others have perspectives different from
one's own.
69
By mid-adolescence, tentative evidence suggests that teens'
capacities for reasoning and understanding may roughly approximate
67. See Beckman, supra note 63, at 599.
68. See generally BARBEL INHELDER & JEAN PIAGET, THE GROWTH OF LOGICAL
THINKING FROM CHILDHOOD TO ADOLESCENCE (Anne Parsons & Stanley Milgram
trans., 1958) (describing changes in adolescents' logistical capacities and the means of
identifying full development of individuals' intelligence); JEAN PIAGET, GENETIC
EPISTEMOLOGY (Eleanor Duckworth trans., 1970) (illustrating the problems and
principles of genetic epistemology through examples of child and adolescent intellect
development); ROBERT S. SIEGLER & MARTHA WAGNER ALIBALI, CHILDREN'S
THINKING 55-64 (4th ed. 2005) (evaluating Piaget's theory and the ongoing relevance of
his work); id at 26-62 (outlining Piaget's theory and updating it based on new data).
69. See sources cited supra note 68. This ability is required, for example, to
understand that what has happened to someone else when they made a particular decision
is likely to happen to oneself, or that what one experienced in a different situation in the
past might be applicable to a current one. Id.
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that of adults-at least in the abstract.70  However, little research
examines adolescent decisionmaking in stressful and unstructured
contexts, where choices have personal salience and decisionmakers
must rely on experience and knowledge.7' These factors may impede
the effective use of youthful cognitive capacities.
3. Emotional Development
Youths and adults also differ in their capacity for impulse
control-the ability to delay response in situations in which emotional
arousal is high. Impulse control allows reactions to be influenced not
only by emotion, but also by reason, and particularly by consideration
of probable consequences. Children acquire impulse control in stages
from birth through adulthood through an iterative learning process
that must be undergone at each new developmental stage." This is
necessary because, as children acquire capacities, their unfamiliarity
with the consequences of new-found abilities results in inevitable
"miscalculations," requiring parental or societal responses that define
acceptable limits of behavior. During the years between twelve and
fifteen, impulse control improves, as adolescents struggle with new
demands for self-direction and self-management; for some
adolescents the process extends well into middle or late adolescence.73
70. INHELDER & PIAGET, supra note 68, at 335 (explaining that certain logic
structures reach an equilibrium point at about fourteen to fifteen years of age). It is
suggested that:
The evidence is tentative for two reasons. First, it is based in part on Piaget's stage
theory of cognitive development, which has been challenged by modern cognitive
scientists. Cognitive psychologists now accept that skills develop at different rates
in different domains, and competence to make one kind of decision cannot be
generalized ... [Second,] the claim is tentative because it is supported by a group
of small research studies conducted in laboratory settings that for the most part
involved white middle class subjects and no adult control groups.
Scott & Steinberg, supra note 3, at 812 n.55.
71. Decisionmaking under stress is often poorer than in ideal conditions. Leon Mann,
Stress, Affect, and Risk Taking, in RISK-TAKING BEHAVIOR 201,214-15 (J. Frank Yates ed.,
1992). It has been proposed, but not yet demonstrated, that the effects of stress on
decisionmaking may be more marked for adolescents than for adults. See Elizabeth
Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, Researching Adolescents' Judgment and Culpability, in
YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 3, at 338-39 (calling for research to explore how group
pressure's influence on decisionmaking varies with the decisionmaker's age).
72. Richard E. Tremblay, The Development of Physical Aggression During Childhood
and the Prediction of Later Dangerousness, in CLINICAL ASSESSMENT OF
DANGEROUSNESS: EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 47, 59-60 (Georges-Franck Pinard &
Linda Pagani eds., 2001).
73. Recall also, from the previous discussion, that early adolescence is a period when
neurological development related to the control of emotion during decisionmaking is still




Adolescents generally are less mature than adults in psychosocial
development, which influences the way they approach decisions,
particularly in the context of social relations.74 Several dimensions of
psychosocial development may be of particular interest for our
purposes: risk perception and preference, future orientation, and
response to adult and peer influence. Each of these factors may
contribute to adolescent decisions that reflect immature judgment.75
Research evidence indicates that adolescents differ from adults
in their perception of and attitude toward risk. Adolescents are less
risk averse than adults, in that they tend to weigh anticipated gains
more heavily than losses in making choices to a greater extent than
adults.76 Youths also, on average, tend to be greater risk-takers,
engaging more frequently in behaviors such as drunken driving,
unprotected sex and criminal activity.77 It is uncertain how much
youthful discounting of risk represents a lesser ability than adults to
recognize risks (risk perception) or a greater inclination to discount
their likelihood or seriousness (risk preference).
Future orientation, the capacity and inclination to project events
into the future and consider future consequences, increases in the
period between childhood and young adulthood. 78 Adolescents tend
to focus on the short-term risks and benefits of decisions and to pay
less attention to long-term consequences than do adults.79 The age
AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR: CURRENT PERSPECTIVES 13, 23 (L. Rowell Huesmann ed.,
1994).
74. These differences probably are the consequence in part of neurological,
intellectual and emotional types of immaturity already discussed. Developmental
psychologists, however, view these factors as additional dimensions of maturation.
Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 71, at 331.
75. See Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decisionmaking in Legal
Contexts, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 221 (1995).
76. See William Gardner, A Life-Span Rational-Choice Theory of Risk Taking, in
ADOLESCENT RISK TAKING 66, 78-79 (Nancy J. Bell & Robert W. Bell eds., 1993); Alida
Benthin et al., A Psychometric Study of Adolescent Risk Perception, 16 J. ADOLESCENCE
153, 166 (1993); Lita Furby & Ruth Beyth-Marom, Risk Taking in Adolescence: A
Decision-Making Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 1, 1-2 (1992).
77. See Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental
Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339, 339-43 (1992); Furby & Beyth-Marom, supra
note 76, at 1-2.
78. See A.L. Greene, Future-Time Perspective in Adolescence: The Present of Things
Future Revisited, 15 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 99, 100 (1986); Jari-Erik Nurmi, How Do
Adolescents See Their Future?: A Review of the Development of Future Orientation and
Planning, 11 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 1, 47-49 (1991).
79. See William Gardner & Janna Herman, Adolescents' AIDS Risk Taking: A
Rational Choice Perspective, in ADOLESCENTS IN THE AIDS EPIDEMIC 17, 17 (William
Gardner et al. eds., 1990); Greene, supra note 78, at 100; Nurmi, supra note 78, at 47-49.
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gap in future orientation may be due to the limited cognitive abilities
of adolescents to think hypothetically; it may be harder for them to
think of remote events. The gap may also be due to adolescents'
more limited life experience; a consequence that will take place years
in the future may simply seem too remote to be given substantial
weight.8 °
Finally, adolescents may differ from adults in the extent to which
others, including adult authority figures and peers, influence their
choices. Adolescence is a sometimes turbulent period of
individuation, separation from parents, and movement toward
autonomy and self-direction-processes that can generate
ambivalence.8 Thus, adolescents can respond to authority figures
compliantly or oppositionally, depending on their mood,
developmental stage, or personal predilection. In addition,
substantial evidence supports that adolescents are more susceptible to
peer influence than are adults. This susceptibility increases in early
adolescence as part of the process of individuating from parents; it
peaks at about age fourteen and declines slowly thereafter.82 At least
during the period of early- and mid-adolescence, decisions often are
driven by acquiescence or opposition to authority or by efforts to gain
peer approval (or avoid peer rejection).83
5. Age and Development
Although policymakers draw age'boundaries between childhood
and adulthood, it is not possible to point to a particular age at which
youths attain adult-like psychological capacities. First, the changes
associated with the four spheres of development do not necessarily
occur together, and even within spheres, different capacities may
develop at different rates.84 Second, there is a great deal of individual
80. Gardner, supra note 76, at 78-79.
81. LAURENCE STEINBERG, ADOLESCENCE 263-65 (5th ed. 1999) (summarizing
research on the development of moral reasoning, religious beliefs, and political views, and
indicating a consolidation of values during the middle and late adolescent years).
82. See Scott et al., supra note 75, at 229-30; Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth
Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent
Decisionmaking, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 249, 257-59 (1996); Laurence Steinberg &
Susan B. Silverberg, The Vicissitudes of Autonomy in Early Adolescence, 57 CHILD DEV.
841, 848 (1986). Changes in susceptibility to peer pressure may reflect changes in
individuals' capacity for self-direction or, as some theorists have suggested, changes in the
intensity of pressure that adolescents exert on each other. See B. Bradford Brown, Peer
Groups and Peer Cultures, in AT THE THRESHOLD: THE DEVELOPING ADOLESCENT 171,
171-72 (S. Shirley Feldman & Glen R. Elliott eds., 1990).
83. Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 71, at 331.
84. Psychosocial development generally proceeds more slowly than neurological or
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variability among youths at any given age in all spheres of
development. For example, an intelligent twelve-year-old may have a
greater capacity to think abstractly than many fifteen-year-olds.
Nevertheless, a significant body of developmental research indicates
that, on average, youths under the age of fourteen differ significantly
from adolescents sixteen to eighteen years of age in their level of
psychological development, with youths in the middle years showing
similarities to and differences from both groups."
B. A Taxonomy of Competence-Related Abilities
The spheres of psychological development described above
affect the functioning of individuals as trial participants; thus, the
research on differences between adolescents and adults provides the
basis for understanding how developmental immaturity affects
youths' competence to stand trial. We turn now to the legal
requirements of competence to identify those abilities that are
important to functioning adequately in the role of criminal defendant.
Three broad types of abilities are implicated under the Dusky
standard for competence to stand trial: (1) a factual understanding of
the proceedings, (2) a rational understanding of the proceedings, and
(3) the ability to assist counsel.86 Although the standard directs courts
to consider these types of abilities, it provides no clear guidance about
their relative importance or about the level of competence required
for each. Few adult defendants have a comprehensive mastery over
all information that is relevant to their criminal trial or function as a
sophisticated partner to their attorney in developing a defense. The
standard permits courts to exercise substantial discretion in deciding
"how much ability is enough" for competence, as long as each of
these factors is weighed in the deliberation.
1. Factual Understanding
The factual understanding component of the Dusky standard has
been extensively described and analyzed.87 This requirement focuses
intellectual maturity because it involves the application and practice of maturing capacities
in other spheres. See id. at 331.
85. The differences between adolescents and adults in these spheres of development
decrease across age groups, such that sixteen- to eighteen-year-olds manifest few
differences from adults in some respects. Id. at 330-31.
86. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960).
87. See generally THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC
ASSESSMENTS AND INSTRUMENTS (2d ed. 2003) (explaining the principles and values of
legally relevant competence evaluations using an empirical framework); GARY B.
MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS (2d ed. 1997)
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on the defendant's knowledge and awareness of the charges and
understanding of the nature of available pleas and possible penalties,
the general steps in the adjudication process, the roles of various
participants in the pre-trial and trial process, and the defendant's
rights in this process. Courts assessing factual understanding are
concerned with capacity rather than actual understanding to the
extent that these can be distinguished; thus, a defendant's deficits in
this realm will rarely be the basis of a finding of incompetence to
stand trial, as long as she has the capacity to learn from brief
instruction.88 Adult defendants with mental retardation may be
disadvantaged in this area. Intellectual immaturity in juveniles may
also undermine this capacity, especially in light of their lesser
experience and more limited ability to grasp abstract concepts such as
"rights."89  Juveniles also may be more likely than adults to have
extensive deficits in their basic knowledge of the trial process, such
that more than brief instruction is needed to attain competence.
2. Rational Understanding
The rational understanding requirement of Dusky has been
interpreted to mean that defendants must comprehend the
implications and significance of what they understand factually
regarding the trial process. 90  Deficits in rational understanding
typically involve distorted or erroneous beliefs that nullify one's
factual understanding.91 For example, an immature defendant may
know that he has a right to remain silent, yet believe that the judge
can take this "right" away at any time by demanding a response to
questions.' In general, immaturity in the intellectual, emotional and
psychosocial spheres may undermine the ability of some adolescents
to grasp accurately the meaning and significance of matters that they
seem to understand factually.
(providing a guide for judges and mental health examiners on insanity, civil commitment,
and other legal issues of mental capacity); RONALD ROESCH & STEPHEN L. GOLDING, A
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF COMPETENCY To STAND TRIAL (1980) (studying forensic
procedures used to determine competency to stand trial in North Carolina with
recommendations for change).
88. MELTON ET AL., supra note 87, at 122.
89. See THOMAS GRISSO, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS: LEGAL AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPETENCE 42-53 (1981); Thomas Grisso, What We Know About
Youths' Capacities as Trial Defendants, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 3, at 139-40.
90. GRISSO, supra note 87, at 84.
91. See supra note 75. To draw again on the Lionel Tate case, a youth might also be
able to describe the terms of a plea agreement that he rejects, but not actually
comprehend the consequences of conviction or the meaning of a long sentence.
92. See Grisso, supra note 89, at 148.
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3. Assisting Counsel and Decisionmaking
The function of assisting counsel in a criminal proceeding has
been associated with three types of abilities.93 One is the defendant's
capacity to receive and communicate information adequately to allow
counsel to prepare a defense. This ability may be impaired by deficits
that interfere with attention and concentration, which may undermine
the defendant's ability to respond to instructions or to provide
important information-such as a coherent account of the events
surrounding the offense. Second, the ability to assist counsel requires
a rational perspective on the attorney and her role, free of notions or
attitudes that could impair the collaborative relationship. Third,
defendants must have the capacity to make decisions about pleading
and the waiver or assertion of other constitutional rights.94 These
decisions involve not only adequate factual and rational
understanding, but also the ability to consider alternatives and make
a choice in a decisionmaking process. These abilities can be
compromised by mental disorders and mental retardation. In
addition, due to intellectual immaturity, youths may lack adequate
capacities to process information and reason in making trial decisions,
especially when the options are complex and their consequences far-
reaching. Moreover, emotional and psychosocial immaturity may
influence youths to make choices that reflect immature judgment.95
As the last Section demonstrated, scientific knowledge clarifies
that adolescents are in a process of acquiring the intellectual,
emotional and psychosocial abilities of adults. Because of their
psychological immaturity, youths may be less capable than are adults
of exercising the various abilities associated with competent trial
participation. However, general developmental psychology
knowledge provides only indirect evidence about the capacities of
youths in this context. What has been lacking until recently is
research that addresses directly whether adolescents' immaturity
actually impairs the abilities required for competent trial
participation.
93. See supra note 65.
94. Although the capacity to make decisions is not explicitly required by Dusky, it was
described as an important part of competence to stand trial by the United States Supreme
Court in Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 397-99 (1993).
95. See infra notes 114-16 and accompanying text. An example in a related context is
the greater tendency of youths than adults to waive Miranda rights. See Grisso, supra note
89, at 192.
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C. The MacArthur Juvenile Adjudicative Competence Study
As juveniles' competence to stand trial began to emerge as an
important issue in recent years, the need for a comprehensive study
comparing the abilities of adolescents and adults in this setting
became apparent. In this Section, we will describe the MacArthur
Juvenile Adjudicative Competence Study, which was conducted in
response to that need. The study was designed to examine
empirically the theoretical relationship between developmental
immaturity and the abilities of young defendants to participate in
their trials. 6  It did not aim to evaluate explicitly adolescents'
competence to stand trial, recognizing that this is a legal judgment.
Rather the purpose of the study was to determine: (1) whether
adolescents and adults differ in abilities implicated under the Dusky
standard; (2) if so, in what ways and to what extent; (3) whether
abilities are related to age, gender, justice system involvement, and to
intellectual and psychosocial development.
1. The Study's Method
a. The Sample
The MacArthur Juvenile Adjudicative Competence Study
included 927 youths and 466 young adults (age eighteen- to twenty-
four) in four communities in the United States.97 The adult and youth
groups each included two subgroups matched for age, gender and
ethnicity-participants involved in the justice system and
"community" participants-individuals from the same neighborhoods
without justice system involvement. 8 The youth participants included
96. The study summarized here is described in detail in Thomas Grisso et al.,
Juveniles' Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of Adolescents' and Adults'
Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333 (2003) [hereinafter Study
Summary]. The study was conducted by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur
Foundation Research Network on Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice. Id. at
362.
97. The study sites were Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Gainesville, Florida, and northern
and central Virginia. Id. at 338.
98. About half the juveniles were in juvenile detention centers and half the adults
were in adult jails awaiting adjudication. Current charges for the detained youths were
primarily (about 80%) offenses against persons and offenses against property, in about
equal proportions. The distribution of charges was similar in the youth and young adult
groups, except that drug-related charges were more frequent in the detained adult sample
(32%) than in the detained youth sample (10%). Id. at 337-38.
Females comprised about one-third of the samples, and the ethnic and racial
groups represented included 40% African-American, 23% Latino, 35% non-Latino White,
and about 2% from other ethnic minorities. The great majority of the youths and adults
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three age categories-eleven to thirteen (20% of the youth sample),
fourteen to fifteen (37%), and sixteen to seventeen (43%).
b. Measures
Along with an intelligence test99 and a measure of symptoms of
mental or emotional disturbance,1°° all study participants were
administered two instruments designed to assess abilities relevant to
competence to stand trial.'a1 The first, the MacArthur Competence
Assessment Tool-Criminal Adjudication ("MacCAT-CA"), was
developed independent of this study specifically to assess (1)
individuals' understanding of charges, penalties, pleas, and roles of
trial participants, and (2) their ability to communicate relevant facts
to counsel and to reason about a plea offer through a standardized
interview procedure.1 2 The MacCAT-CA was administered by its
developers to large numbers of adult defendants (in jails) for whom
competence was not questioned, as well as to individuals in forensic
psychiatric facilities who had recently been found incompetent to
stand trial.0 3 The norms based on these adult defendants were used
to set a cut-off score.14 Scores below the cut off were considered to
represent significant impairment and were far more frequently
achieved by persons who had been found incompetent to stand
trial.105
The study also used a second measure of performance, the
MacArthur Judgment Evaluation ("MacJEN"), which was designed
for this study to assess psychosocial influences on decisionmaking
related to trial participation. Through a standardized interview
were of lower to low-middle socioeconomic status. Id. at 337.
99. Id. at 339; DAVID WECHSLER, PSYCHOLOGICAL CORP., WECHSLER
ABBREVIATED SCALE OF INTELLIGENCE (1999).
100. Study Summary, supra note 96, at 339; THOMAS GRISSO & RICHARD BARNUM,
MASSACHUSETrs YOUTH SCREENING INSTRUMENT-SECOND VERSION: USERS
MANUAL AND TECHNICAL REPORT (2000).
101. Detained youths and adults were also administered an index of prior justice
system experience inquiring whether they had ever before been either (1) "found guilty"
of a crime or (2) "locked up" in a detention center or jail. Study Summary, supra note 96,
at 339.
102. See ADJUDICATIVE COMPETENCE: THE MACARTHUR STUDIES 112 (Poythress
et. al., eds. 2002). Items in the assessment instrument are scored 2 (adequate), 1
(questionable), or 0 (inadequate) according to strict criteria for each item provided in the
manual. The total score for the first set of items ("1" above, 8 items) is called the
"Understanding" score, and the total for the second group ("2" above, 8 items) is called
the "Reasoning" score. Id. at 113.
103. Id. at 115.
104. Id. at 116.
105. Id. at 117-18.
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process, participants were asked to make choices and to explain their
reasons, in response to three hypothetical vignettes involving police
questioning, consultation with an attorney, and a plea offer.106 The
instrument was designed to assess whether individual responses and
explanations for their choices were related to risk perception, future
orientation, or influence. 10 7
2. The Study's Results
The findings of the study confirmed the hypothesis that
competence-related abilities improve with age during adolescence. 18
On average, youths ages eleven to thirteen demonstrated significantly
poorer understanding of trial matters, as well as poorer reasoning and
recognition of the relevance of information for a legal defense, than
did fourteen- to fifteen-year-old youths, who in turn performed
significantly more poorly on average than did sixteen- to seventeen-
year-olds and young adults. There were no differences between the
sixteen- to seventeen-year-olds and the young adults. The study
produced similar results when adolescents and adults were identified
according to their scores above or below cut-off scores for significant
impairment. Thirty percent of eleven- to thirteen-year-olds and 19%
of fourteen- to fifteen-year-olds, but only 12% of sixteen- to
seventeen-year-olds and of young adults evidenced deficits in either
(or both) Reasoning or Understanding in their responses on the
MacCat-CA. 1°9
Intelligence test scores ("IQ") were also significantly related to
106. The first vignette focused on a decision to waive the right to silence; the second
involved a decision to reveal information to counsel; and the third dealt with a plea
decision of either taking a plea offer or refusing the offer and going to trial. Study
Summary, supra note 96, at 340.
107. See supra notes 67-76 and accompanying text.
108. Study Summary, supra note 96, at 356. These findings are based on the
Understanding and Reasoning scores on the MacCAT-CA. In general, we will describe
only the main significant results of the study, without reference to the statistical details
(which are provided in the original report). The term "significant" when referring to
differences between groups in the following descriptions means that statistical analysis
indicated that two groups differed to an extent that would not be likely by chance.
109. Id. at 343-46. Because the question of individuals' competence can involve
deficits in either Understanding or Reasoning, an assessment of impairments in individuals
in different age categories must count low scores in either of these dimensions. Twenty
percent of eleven- to thirteen-year-olds and 13% of fourteen- to fifteen-year-olds showed
significantly impaired Understanding, whereas only 7% of sixteen- to seventeen-year-olds
and the same proportion of young adults scored in the significantly impaired range.
Results were similar for Reasoning. Some individuals scored below the cut-off in both
dimensions, while some had a low score in only one. Id.
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MacCAT-CA Understanding and Reasoning, 110 with low IQ youths in
the younger age groups being particularly likely to evidence serious
deficits, showing "significant impairment." For example, for youths
who scored 60-74 on IQ measures, 55% of eleven- to thirteen-year-
olds and 40% of fourteen- to fifteen-year-olds scored in the
significantly impaired range on the Understanding or Reasoning
sections on the MacCAT-CA. These results are especially important
because a greater proportion of detained youths were in the lower 10
ranges compared to community youths, a finding that is consistent
with other research."' However, although intelligence was a
significant factor in accounting for individuals' performance on the
MacCAT-CA, the relation between age and performance was
important independent of intelligence."2
Further analyses indicated that MacCAT-CA Understanding and
Reasoning scores did not differ significantly according to gender,
ethnicity, or, in the detained groups, to the extent of prior justice
system experience. They also were not related to youths' scores on
the measure of mental and emotional disturbances." 3
The MacJEN interview instrument, designed to measure
psychosocial influences on decisionmaking, assessed individuals'
110. Id. at 344. For example, "significant impairment" scores on either Understanding
or Reasoning were obtained by about 40% of individuals with IQ scores of 60-74, 24% of
individuals with IQ scores of 75-89, and 7% of individuals with IQ scores of 90 and above.
Id.
111. Youth with intellectual impairments are disproportionately represented in
juvenile justice facilities. Peter Leone & Sheri Meisel, Improving Education Services for
Students in Detention and Confinement Facilities, 17 CHILD LEGAL RTS. J. 1, 2-3 (1997).
About 13% of juvenile offenders are mentally retarded, and about 36% have learning
disorders. Pamela Casey & Ingo Keilitz, Estimating the Prevalence of Learning Disabled
and Mentally Retarded Juvenile Offenders: A Meta-Analysis, in UNDERSTANDING
TROUBLED AND TROUBLING YOUTH 82, 86 (Peter Leone ed., 1990). Low intelligence is
associated generally with delinquent behavior and conduct disorders. PAUL J. FRICK,
CONDUCT DISORDERS AND SEVERE ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR 46-47 (1998); Travis
Hirschi & Michael J. Hindelang, Intelligence and Delinquency: A Revisionist Review, 42
AM. Soc. REV. 571, 584 (1977).
112. Study Summary, supra note 96, at 348-50. For example, while detained youths on
average were much lower in IQ than the community youths, the differences across age
groups (described earlier) were .apparent for both detained and community youths
compared to detained and community adults. Id.
113. Note, however, that this does not mean that youths with mental disorders will
perform similarly on competence abilities to youths without mental disorders. The
measure used in this study did not provide diagnoses of mental disorders, but rather
mental and emotional distress. Moreover, it is unlikely that our samples included detained
youths with serious mental disorders. The youths were in pretrial detention centers, and
seriously mentally ill youths referred to the juvenile justice system are not likely to be
retained in detention centers, but rather referred to mental health facilities in order to
provide emergency responses to their mental disorders.
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choices in three hypothetical legal situations. Significant differences
among age groups were found in choices on the police interrogation
and the plea agreement vignette. For example, youths were much
more likely to recommend waiving constitutional rights in
interrogation than were adults, with 55% of eleven- to thirteen-year-
olds, 40% of fourteen- to fifteen-year-olds, and 30% of sixteen- to
seventeen-year-olds choosing to "talk and admit" involvement in an
alleged offense (rather than "remain silent"), whereas only 15% of
the young adults made this choice."' The plea agreement vignette
was styled so as not to clearly favor accepting or rejecting the state's
offer, which probably accounted for the fact that young adults were
evenly divided in their responses. In contrast, 75% of the eleven- to
thirteen-year-olds, 65% of fourteen- to fifteen-year-olds, and 60% of
the sixteen- to seventeen-year-olds recommended accepting the plea
offer. Together, these results suggest a much stronger tendency for
adolescents than for young adults to make choices in compliance with
the perceived desires of authority figures.
Analysis of participant responses to the MacJEN vignettes also
found evidence of differences in risk perception and future
orientation between the youngest age group and older subjects.
Participants were asked to explain their choices, including perceived
positive and negative consequences of various options; questions
probed the subjects' assessment of the seriousness of risks (the
perceived negative consequences) and likelihood of occurrence."'
Analyses indicated age differences for all of these dimensions of "risk
perception," with the eleven- to thirteen age group scoring lower than
the sixteen- to seventeen-year-olds and young adults. Similarly,
eleven- to thirteen-year-olds reported significantly fewer long-range
consequences than did older adolescents, suggesting differences in
future orientation.11 6
3. Other Research on Youths' Capacities in the Adjudicative Process
The MacArthur Juvenile Adjudicative Competence Study
provides the most comprehensive and targeted investigation to date
114. Defense attorneys uniformly would agree that admitting involvement in the crime,
unless advised to do so by counsel is almost always a choice that is not in the defendant's
interest. Eighty percent of adults favored remaining silent.
115. The MacJEN provided a method for categorizing and scoring individuals'
explanations according to several psychosocial factors. Study Summary, supra note 96, at
353-56.
116. Somewhat similar results were found for a set of "resistance to peer influence"




comparing youths' and adults' abilities as trial defendants. Several
other studies, however, have produced results that are consistent with
the MacArthur study findings. For example, a study of youths' and
adults' capacities to understand Miranda rights found that, as
compared to adults in the criminal justice system, fourteen-year-old
youths in juvenile detention manifested significantly inferior
comprehension of the meaning and importance of Miranda
warnings."7 Other studies using smaller samples have found age
differences across the adolescent years with regard to knowledge of
legal terms and the legal process in delinquency/criminal
adjudication." 8 Although few studies before the MacArthur study
examined youths' reasoning and decisionmaking in the context of
adjudication, an exception is a series of studies that found significant
age differences across the adolescent years in "strategic thinking"
about pleas. The researchers found older adolescents more likely
than younger subjects to make choices that reflected calculations of
probabilities and costs based on information provided." 9
4. Summary and Implications
The MacArthur Juvenile Adjudicative Competence Study found
that adolescents younger than sixteen years of age are significantly
117. GRISSO, supra note 89. The study involved about 400 youths aged fourteen and
under and 200 adults.
118. See Deborah K. Cooper, Juveniles' Understanding of Trial-Related Information:
Are They Competent Defendants? 15 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 167, 177-78 (1997); Vance
Cowden & Geoffrey McKee, Competency to Stand Trial in Juvenile Delinquency
Proceedings: Cognitive Maturity and the Attorney-Client Relationship, 33 LOUISVILLE J.
FAM. L. 629, 651-57 (1995); Michele Peterson-Badali & Rona Abramovitch, Children's
Knowledge of the Legal System: Are They Competent to Instruct Legal Counsel?, 34
CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIM. JUST. 139 (1992); Michele Peterson-Badali et al.,
Young Children's Legal Knowledge and Reasoning Ability, 39 CANADIAN J.
CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIM. JUST. 145 (1997); Jeffrey C. Savitsky & Deborah Karras,
Competency To Stand Trial Among Adolescents, 19 ADOLESCENCE 349 (1984); Barbara
Zaremba, Comprehension of Miranda Rights by 14- to 18-Year-Old African American
and Caucasian Males With and Without Learning Disabilities (1992) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, College of William and Mary). These studies involved no adult comparison
groups.
119. See Rona Abramovitch et al., Young People's Understanding and Assertion of
Their Rights to Silence and Legal Counsel, 37 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIM.
JUST. 1 (1995); Michele Peterson-Badali & Rona Abramovitch, Grade Related Changes in
Young People's Reasoning About Plea Decisions, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 537, 549-50
(1993); Peterson-Badali et al., supra note 118. When hypothetical pleading situations were
varied in terms of seriousness of offense charged and strength of evidence against the
defendant, most mid- and late-adolescent youths made choices that reflected the different
"odds" and "costs" in these conditions. But adolescents under fourteen years of age were
much less likely to alter their responses in ways that made sense "strategically."
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more likely than adults to manifest deficits in abilities that are
important to competent trial participation. The risk of competence-
related deficits was high for youths under fourteen years of age, and
those younger adolescents with poor intellectual abilities showed the
highest level of risk. This is significant, because the average IQ for
youths in detention centers (the group whose competence is actually
at issue in criminal proceedings) is about 85, far below the average of
100 for youths in general. In addition, the study found significant
differences between adolescents and young adults in choices related
to adjudication, with the youngest group more often making choices
that seemed to reflect acquiescence to the perceived wishes of
authority figures. Moreover, younger adolescents' reasons for their
choices were consistent with expectations based on developmental
psychology research that many adolescents display psychosocial
immaturity in the areas of risk perception and consideration of long-
range consequences.
The limitations of these results should be emphasized. The fact
that younger participants scored more frequently than adults in the
"significantly impaired" range on the MacCAT-CA does not
necessarily mean that all such youths should be considered
incompetent to stand trial.12° That is a legal judgment that may be
based on a broader range of abilities than is measured by the
MacCAT-CA, which only inquires about understanding of a limited
number of facts about the charges and roles of trial participants,
reasoning regarding a hypothetical decision (not the youth's own
case), and does not probe communication and other abilities that
might be important in assisting counsel.21
For several reasons, however, the results of this study likely do
not overstate the risk of incompetence to stand trial among youths
charged with crimes. First, as mentioned, the intellectual functioning
of youths in the justice system is likely to be lower than community
means, and this deficit is likely to be associated with impaired
competence. Second, some youths who performed marginally (but
120. There were several groups of defendants in the original MacCAT-CA study. For
some the question of competence had never been raised during their adjudication and
they were presumed competent. Others had been found incompetent by judges and they
were being treated to restore their competence. Not all incompetent individuals scored in
the "significantly impaired" range when tested, and some competent individuals scored in
the "significantly impaired" range. But a greater proportion of incompetent than
competent defendants scored in that range. Study Summary, supra note 96, at 340.
121. Moreover, some individuals scoring in the "significantly impaired" range might be
able to perform better as defendants if given proper assistance, thus obviating the need to
find them incompetent to stand trial. Id.
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not in the "significantly impaired" range) on the MacCAT-CA may
be impaired in other capacities related to adequate trial performance
that are not measured by this instrument. Finally, although the
MacArthur Study included youths with mild or moderate mental
illness or retardation, youths with serious illness or disability were
excluded. 122 The inclusion of such youths would undoubtedly have
produced a greater proportion of youths with "significantly impaired"
performance on the MacCAT-CA.
In light of general developmental knowledge about psychological
maturation in early- and mid-adolescence, the findings of the
MacArthur study are not surprising. Indeed, given the abilities
required of defendants in criminal proceedings, it would be puzzling if
youths and adults performed similarly on the competence-related
measures. The study provides powerful and tangible evidence that
many youths facing criminal charges may function less capably in the
role of criminal defendant than do their adult counterparts.
III. TAKING COMPETENCE SERIOUSLY: A FRAMEWORK OF
REFORM
In this Part, we explore the implications for contemporary
criminal justice policy of taking seriously the scientific evidence that
we have described. At a minimum, the research on adolescent
development and adjudicative competence challenges courts to
consider incompetence claims based on immaturity along with those
caused by mental illness and disability. We will argue, however, that
the features that distinguish incompetence based on immaturity from
the more familiar variations make this simple doctrinal response
inadequate. The incorporation of a developmental competence
requirement into youth crime regulation necessitates more extensive
institutional and doctrinal adjustments, if substantial disruption of
criminal and juvenile proceedings is to be avoided. Most importantly,
the adoption of dual standards of competence is necessary if juvenile
delinquency proceedings are to serve as default dispositions for
youths found incompetent in criminal courts; generally, this is the key
to avoiding an institutional crisis under which large numbers of
incompetent youths cannot be adjudicated in either court. We argue
that youths who are incompetent under the Dusky standard can be
122. The study excluded youths with IQ scores below 60. Moreover, there were few if
any youths in the study who had mental disorders serious enough to require psychiatric
care, because those youths typically would have been diverted to psychiatric hospital units
and thus would not have been available as research subjects in the juvenile detention
centers where the study was performed. Id.
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subject to a relaxed competence standard in juvenile court without
violating constitutional norms so long as the dispositions to which
they are subject are different in purpose and punitiveness from
criminal sentences. We then explore dispositional options for the
(small number of) youths who are incompetent even under the
standard applied in juvenile court. Finally, we examine the options
for institutional reform of the juvenile court available to lawmakers
responding to the challenge we raise.
A. The Unique Features of Developmental Incompetence
In the context of the recent punitive reforms, the scientific
evidence that we have described challenges both juvenile and
criminal courts to assure that youths who are incompetent on the
basis of immaturity are not subject to adjudication. This information
may lead courts and legislatures simply to expand the category of
juvenile defendants subject to assessment, determination, and
treatment of competence to include youths of questionable capacity
due to their immaturity. Predictably, as developmental incompetence
gains recognition, attorneys and judges will become attuned to
discerning these incapacities in immature youths in the trial context
and take steps to protect them. Under this "minimalist" response,
courts applying the Dusky standard will determine whether individual
youths are capable of understanding the proceedings and assisting
counsel and will exclude those who are not until their competence is
demonstrated.
Although a few jurisdictions appear to have adopted this
approach to developmental competence,'23  it likely will prove
inadequate as a response that satisfies the requirements of fairness
and due process without seriously disrupting the functioning of the
justice system. This is so because two features of developmental
incompetence distinguish the incapacities of youths from those of
mentally ill or retarded defendants whose competence is uncertain-
features that may point to a need for different policy responses. First,
the incidence of trial incompetence is likely to be much higher among
teens (until age sixteen) than among adult defendants. Second, the
standard "remedy" for incompetence-a brief intervention based on
medication and instruction-may not suffice for youths whose
incapacities are due to immaturity.
As we have indicated, a small percentage of seriously impaired
123. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-169.1 (Michie 2004); VA. COMM'N ON YOUTH, STUDY
OF JUVENILE COMPETENCY ISSUES IN LEGAL PROCEEDINGS, H. Doc. No. 42 (1999).
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adult defendants are referred for competence evaluations and an
even smaller percent are found to be incompetent to stand trial. In
contrast, the MacArthur study indicates that more than one-third of
youths age eleven to thirteen years may have significant impairments
in competence-related abilities, and the capacities of a substantial
percentage of fourteen- and fifteen-year-olds are questionable as
well. The significance of these findings, which are compatible with
other competence studies and with general developmental
knowledge, should not be minimized. If a substantial portion of
defendants under age sixteen are likely to be of questionable
competence, then a youth in this age category should not be subject
to criminal prosecution until a court has determined that she is
competent on the basis of an evaluation, unless the defense,
prosecution, and court agree that it is unnecessary. Moreover, the
research suggests that, under the conventional Dusky standard, a
substantial percentage of younger adolescents in juvenile court may
be at risk for incompetence. The upshot is that, in contrast to the
incidence of competence inquiries among adult defendants, the issue
is salient for most, if not all, youths under the age of sixteen.'24
The second difference between immaturity-based impairments of
competence and those caused by mental illness and retardation is that
the standard disposition provided to incompetent defendants may not
be appropriate or effective for many youths. Defendants found
incompetent to stand trial under most statutes are committed to a
mental health facility for a brief period to be restored to competence
through a program that usually combines intensive instruction and
psychotropic medication directed at alleviating psychotic symptoms. 2 '
124. To be sure, a substantial percentage of mid-adolescents will likely be competent.
However, the percentage of youths at risk for incompetence in this category is high
enough that attorneys should routinely consider whether their young clients' competence
is in doubt.
125. Most incompetent defendants are required to participate in competence training,
which includes instruction about the trial, the participants, the charges facing the
defendant, the meaning of pleas, and the possible consequences. Furthermore,
For mentally ill defendants, restoration usually entails a relatively brief period of
roughly six months of psychiatric hospitalization to stabilize and medicate the
defendant so as to eliminate or reduce psychotic symptoms such as paranoia,
thought disorder, loose associations, and delusions or hallucinations. For
defendants with mental retardation, low educational levels, poor fluency in
English, or few years in the United States, restoration to competency (or, more
accurately, development of competency) may require outpatient psychoeducation
that teaches defendants about the legal proceedings and any social or
communication skills necessary to work with their attorney and comport
themselves appropriately in court.
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This regimen is effective with most defendants, who generally are
restored to competence in a few months and returned to court. 26
Incompetent defendants cannot be held indefinitely; in Jackson v.
Indiana,'27 the Supreme Court held that indeterminate long-term
commitment violates constitutional due process. 28 In response to
Jackson, many states provide for a statutory restoration period of a
year or less after which charges must be dropped and the defendant
released. 9
This framework may be ill-suited to immature youths who have
never attained competence. Although some youths may become
competent with instruction about the trial process, their attorney's
role and other matters necessary for adequate participation, many
will simply need time to mature. Immaturity-based incompetence
that relates to rational understanding and decisionmaking capacity
often can be remedied only through the process of psychological
development. If this period of maturing extends into the future for a
year or more, it becomes problematic on due process grounds under
Jackson. Although child advocates might be satisfied with dismissal
of the charges against immature youths who cannot be made
competent with instruction, this solution is unlikely to be acceptable
to those whose primary concern is public protection. 30 Moreover,
many observers believe that accountability for criminal conduct is an
Redding & Frost, supra note 7, at 367.
126. See Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 18, at 78-79 ("In the vast majority of such cases,
the defendant is returned to the court for trial within six months.").
127. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
128. In Jackson, the defendant was mentally impaired, deaf, and mute. Id. at 717. He
was found to be incompetent to stand trial and the trial court ruled that he be committed
until he was certified sane. Id. at 719. Justice Blackmun, writing for a unanimous Court,
noted that Jackson had been confined for three and one-half years and was unlikely to
"ever be able to participate fully in a trial." Id. at 738-39. The Court held that due
process requires a person "committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to
trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine
whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable
future." Id. at 738.
129. See, e.g., ARIZ REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4510 (West 2004) (six months); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 916.13 (West 2001) (six months); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-130 (2004) (nine months);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-3-3 (West 1998) (six months). Some states have no statutory
limitation. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-169.2 to 169.3, 37.1-67.3 (Michie 2004)
(providing for reassessments every six months). Some defendants who cannot be restored
to competence may be eligible for civil commitment under standards that focus on the
whether the individual is mentally ill and an imminent danger to himself or others. Id
§ 19.2-169.3.
130. Punitive policies receive support, according to one such advocate, because "those
detained will be less likely to re-offend. Furthermore, those who cannot be rehabilitated
... will then be incarcerated so that they are not back out on the streets." Chamberlin,
supra note 3, at 410.
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important component in the rehabilitation of young criminals; on this
view, dismissal of charges harms young offenders as well as society."'
Because of the distinctive features of developmental
incompetence, adoption of the minimalist approach may impose an
unacceptable burden on courts and on society that ultimately may
result in a weakening of the due process rights of youths. Predictably,
under this approach, both criminal and (particularly) juvenile courts
are likely to be flooded with petitions for competence evaluations and
large numbers of youths could be found incompetent, with no
satisfactory disposition available for many of them. Under these
circumstances, this constitutional requirement is likely to be given lip
service without providing any substantial protection for immature
youths. The upshot is that a minimalist approach that simply
recognizes this form of incapacity without making other doctrinal and
structural adjustments is likely to be inadequate.
B. The Case for Dual Competence Standards
1. Why Dual Standards Are Necessary
The unique features of developmental incompetence create a
dilemma for courts unless appropriate mechanisms are available for
responding to youths who are incompetent to proceed under the
conventional legal standard. To be sure, some youths may be found
incompetent simply because they lack adequate understanding about
the purposes and operation of a criminal trial.132 They may respond
to focused "competence training" programs designed to provide
instruction that will enable them to function in their assigned role
with at least minimal effectiveness. The question is how to respond to
youths whose developmental incapacity is not correctable with short-
term remedial instruction.
It is critically important to find a satisfactory answer to this
question. Consider the dilemma faced by a criminal court judge
deliberating about the competence of a thirteen-year-old charged
with aggravated assault and armed robbery. The charges arose from
an incident in which the youth and his friends allegedly ran off with
131. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE
89-96 (1982).
132. Although lack of information and experience per se is not a sufficient basis for
competence, some youths, because of worldly inexperience, may lack a basic
comprehension of what the proceeding is about and what are the functions of the various
participants. An intensive program that instructs them on these matters may be sufficient
to create competence.
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an elderly woman's purse after attacking her brutally with a tire iron,
causing her to suffer serious injuries. The youth, because of his
extreme immaturity and low IQ, fails to comprehend the seriousness
of the charges or the consequences of conviction. He can provide
little assistance to his attorney, and it seems highly unlikely that these
deficits can be remedied in the near future. If the court decides, as it
should, that the youth is incompetent, neither dismissal of the charges
nor long-term indefinite confinement ("waiting for maturity") will be
acceptable dispositions; the former sacrifices public safety and
accountability, and the latter violates constitutional norms.
In our view, the disposition that is appropriate for this youth and
for most developmentally incompetent youths is adjudication in a
juvenile delinquency proceeding. If a juvenile court adjudicates the
charges against the youth, it can determine whether he committed the
crime and, if so, it can structure a disposition based on remediation,
accountability, and public safety. This outcome is possible only if
criminal and juvenile courts apply dual standards of competence, such
that a youth who is found incompetent in a criminal proceeding can
be adjudicated under more relaxed criteria in juvenile court. Such a
regime largely resolves the dispositional quandary faced by courts
dealing with immature youths charged with serious crimes. On the
other hand, if a uniform standard is applied in both judicial contexts,
the youth excluded from criminal court on grounds of incompetence
would also be unable to participate in delinquency proceedings.
The application of dual competence standards in criminal and
delinquency proceedings is important for another reason; it is the
means to avoid profound disruption of juvenile delinquency
proceedings. Although few thirteen-year-olds are subject to criminal
charges, many face adjudication in juvenile court. The research
evidence suggests that evenhanded application of adult competence
criteria may well result in the disqualification of a substantial
percentage of youngsters from adjudication in any court. This
outcome is jarring in light of uncontroversial premises of juvenile
court jurisdiction; few would challenge the appropriateness of
delinquency proceedings for younger teens. Thus, as a policy matter,
a strong case can be made for a relaxed juvenile court competence
standard under which immature youths could be tried in delinquency
proceedings, even though they are incompetent to stand trial under
adult criteria.
2. Dual Standards Under the Due Process Clause
The critical question then becomes whether less demanding
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competence criteria in juvenile court satisfy the mandates of due
process. As we have indicated, some post-Gault courts have assumed
that the adult competence standard must be applied in delinquency
proceedings. Other courts effectively have adopted dual standards,
suggesting that the juvenile court standard is based on "juvenile
norms" and emphasizing that a finding of incompetence in a criminal
proceeding would not necessarily bar delinquency adjudication. 33
These courts assume, rather than conclude on the basis of analysis,
that dual standards violate no constitutional norm. Thus, their
observations, at most, simply reflect an intuition that delinquency and
criminal proceedings differ in their clientele, purposes and
consequences, and that a relaxed competence standard in juvenile
court is acceptable because of these differences. However, because
the central feature of the legal framework that we endorse is a regime
of dual standards, and because that feature is likely to be somewhat
controversial, it is important to demonstrate that this approach
satisfies due process."
The principle of fundamental fairness is the broad constitutional
standard under which courts evaluate procedural challenges in both
criminal and delinquency proceedings. The Supreme Court has made
clear, however, that due process does not require that the
constitutional protections afforded youths in juvenile court replicate
those offered defendants in criminal trials. Emphasizing the unique
features of juvenile proceedings, the Court has found that some
important safeguards, such as the rights to a jury trial and to bail,
would undermine the purposes of the juvenile justice system and are
not essential to fair process in this setting.135
The question that we address is not whether delinquency
proceedings are subject to the competence requirement at all-we
133. See Golden v. State, 21 S.W.3d 801, 803 (Ark. 2000); People v. Carey, 615 N.w.2d
742,748 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000).
134. Some courts insist that the adult standard be applied in delinquency proceedings
(although without analyzing the implications of doing so). See, e.g., In re W.A.F., 573 A.2d
1264, 1267 (D.C. 1990) ("Accordingly, we hold that the determination of mental
competency of a juvenile is one of those instances where the procedure followed in adult
criminal prosecutions must be applied to juvenile delinquency proceedings.") (emphasis
added).
135. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971), the Court emphasized the
detrimental impact of a jury trial on delinquency proceedings, in light of the purposes of
the juvenile court, stating that "[ijf the jury trial were to be injected into the juvenile court
system as a matter of right, it would bring with it into the system the traditional delay, the
formality and the clamor of the adversary system." Id. at 550; see also Schall v. Martin,
467 U.S. 253, 281 (1984) (holding that juveniles can be held in pretrial detention without a
bail hearing).
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take that to be settled-but whether the application of a relaxed
standard in this setting (requiring less competence than is required in
a criminal proceeding) can satisfy the demands of due process. As a
purely conceptual matter, the adoption of dual standards is quite
feasible because competence, unlike many procedural protections is
largely a continuous rather than binary construct. Typically, the
inquiry about incorporation of constitutional safeguards is posed as a
categorical choice between extending or not extending a particular
protection to delinquency proceedings. However, the legal boundary
between competence and incompetence is located along a continuum
by legal authorities on the basis of a mix of policy concerns. Thus, in
theory, lawmakers could require a higher level of competence than
Dusky mandates-the capacity to independently make all key trial
decisions, for example.136 That the standard is not so demanding
reflects an implicit balancing of defendants' rights and interests
against the public interest in bringing criminals to justice. The upshot
for our purposes is that the competence thresholds for delinquency
and criminal proceedings can be fixed at different locations on the
basis different policy demands.
This, of course, does not resolve the question of whether dual
standards satisfy the mandate of due process. The Supreme Court
has emphasized that the Constitution does not require the wholesale
incorporation of adult procedural rights into delinquency
proceedings, but has offered no test to guide the determination of
whether a contested procedural protection is required by
fundamental fairness. However, several themes that can be extracted
from the Court's examination of due process claims in this context
inform our analysis. First, the Court has emphasized that a
procedural safeguard that is likely to be "disruptive of the unique
nature of the juvenile process" '137 and to dilute its beneficial aspects
may not be required in juvenile court.138 For reasons that we have
discussed, this consideration is highly salient in evaluating the impact
of a uniform competence standard. However, this deference rests on
the assumption that a juvenile delinquency proceeding is different
from a criminal trial in ways that serve the interests of youths facing
136. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 402 (1993) (declining to hold that an
independent determination of defendants' competence to make specific decisions-
waiving right to counsel and enter a guilty plea-is mandated by due process).
137. McKiever, 403 U.S. at 540.
138. Id. at 550 (faulting the jury trial for bringing "delay, the formality, and the clamor
of the adversary system and, possibly, the public trial" which ignores "every aspect of




charges in juvenile court.139 This qualifying condition is important to
our analysis, leading us to conclude that, regardless of its disruptive
impact, a relaxed juvenile court competence standard is
constitutionally sufficient only if delinquency proceedings promote
the welfare of youths who do not meet the adult standard. 4 ° Finally,
the Court has focused on whether a contested procedural safeguard is
important for accurate factfinding in the adjudication of criminal
charges.141  We extend this concern to examine whether a relaxed
juvenile court competence standard adequately satisfies the purposes
of the competence requirement as applied in this setting.
As to the first consideration about the disruptiveness of the
proposed procedure, the earlier discussion makes clear that serious
disruption of delinquency proceedings is likely to follow if a uniform
competence standard is applied in criminal and juvenile courts and
that this can be avoided by adopting a relaxed standard. First,
139. In holding that juveniles do not have a right to a jury trial in delinquency
proceedings, the McKiever Court emphasized the rehabilitative purposes of the juvenile
court and expressed a reluctance to give up on those purposes. See supra notes 137-38.
Under the Court's general approach to due process, the type and extent of procedural
protection required depends on contingencies of the legal setting. In the context of civil
proceedings, the Court has emphasized the flexibility of the constitutional norm, which
"'calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.' " Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
140. As we argue infra Part III.D, these conditions could be the basis of institutional
reform of juvenile dispositions in general or they could be applied only to youths who fail
to meet the adult standard.
141. In general, due process analysis focuses on whether particular procedures are
necessary to avoid error. In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the Court
formulated a test for evaluating due process claims in civil proceedings. The Mathews
formula requires consideration of three factors-the private interest affected by the
official action; the risk of an erroneous deprivation through the procedures used and the
value of additional procedural safeguards; and th6 government's interest, including fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional requirement would entail. Id. at 334-35.
It is unclear whether the Mathews test applies to criminal proceedings, and we
have not based our analysis on its criteria. The Supreme Court has applied it to
challenged procedures in criminal proceedings occasionally, see, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma,
470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985) (determining whether an indigent defendant should be provided a
psychiatrist), and has described it as a "a general approach for testing challenged state
procedures under a due process claim." Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 599 (1979).
However, in Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992), the Court, while upholding a state
procedural rule putting the burden of proving competence on the defendant, declined to
apply the Mathews framework to the claim, suggesting that it was not applicable to
criminal proceedings. Id. at 443. Instead, the Court insisted that the due process standard
in criminal proceedings is fundamental fairness. Id. at 445. Mathews has been applied to
many non-criminal procedures in which the deprivation of individual liberty is at stake.
See, e.g., Parham, 442 U.S. at 599-600 (involving voluntarily committed children in a state
mental hospital); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (involving civil
commitment procedures).
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juvenile courts that apply the adult standard are likely to be burdened
with a flood of petitions for competence evaluations and hearings,
resulting in a major diversion of financial and human resources to a
process that most would agree should have limited importance in this
legal setting. Also, if many younger defendants are found
incompetent under the adult standard, government efforts to protect
the public from youth crime, to hold young offenders accountable,
and to provide them with rehabilitative services will be undermined.
As we have argued, a doctrinal regime under which many younger
teens-particularly those charged with serious crimes-might be
immune from prosecution probably would be rejected as
unacceptable, and ultimately, would undermine the legitimacy of the
juvenile court. Under a tailored juvenile court standard, this
procedural safeguard can function to exclude only those youths
whose extreme immaturity makes even juvenile court adjudication
inappropriate.
Although the potentially disruptive impact of a uniform
competence standard seems clear, the constitutional adequacy of a
dual-standards regime also depends on whether delinquency
proceedings differ substantially from criminal proceedings, such that
the more protective adult standard is not mandated in this setting.
The interest of adult defendants facing criminal punishment justifies
the existing competence requirement and serves as a baseline for
evaluating the interests of juveniles in delinquency proceedings. In
other cases dealing with procedures resulting in deprivations of
liberty, the Court has made clear that the state's purposes in
restricting liberty and the impact on affected individuals are key to
evaluating the mandates of due process. For example, where the
state's purpose in confining an individual is to provide treatment for
mental illness, the procedural requirements of criminal proceedings
can be relaxed.142
A relaxed competence standard will meet this second condition
142. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), found that involuntary civil commitment
can be ordered upon proof by clear and convincing evidence; because the state's purpose
is not punitive and because of added safeguards such as professional observation and
family concern, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not required. Id. at 428. However, an
intermediate standard of proof was required because of the individual's interest in
avoiding the deprivation of liberty, based on an erroneous decision; thus, the
preponderance of the evidence standard was found to be inadequate. Id. at 426-27; see
also Parham, 442 U.S. at 599-609 (holding that youths whose parents seek to admit them
to psychiatric facilities have a liberty interest in avoiding erroneous placement, but that an
adversary proceeding is unnecessary to protect that interest because of the treatment




of "distinctiveness" if delinquency proceedings are different from
criminal trials in two important dimensions. The first concerns the
severity of punishment and its impact on the future lives of young
offenders. Juvenile court sanctions, especially for serious crimes,
must be of shorter duration than those imposed on adult criminals.
Moreover, dispositions should be completed within a self-contained
juvenile correctional system, such that they do not extend into
adulthood or affect adult status or opportunities. 143 The traditional
juvenile justice system was characterized by dispositions more lenient
than the adult system, and contemporary regimes can be evaluated
along this dimension as well.' 44 If the dispositional differences are
insufficient in this regard, the adult standard must be applied.
The distinctiveness condition also requires that the purposes of
delinquency proceedings must be broader than those of criminal
proceedings and must include consideration of the welfare of young
offenders. Today, to be sure, criminal and delinquency proceedings
both aim to punish offenders, deter crime and protect public safety
through the incapacitation of dangerous persons. However, the
juvenile system, traditionally at least, also has been committed to
treatment and to offering dispositions that enhance the likelihood
that delinquent youths will become productive adults. This
distinction from the adult justice system is important in the
justification of a relaxed competence standard in delinquency
proceedings.
The upshot of our analysis is that whether a juvenile court
adjudication is sufficiently different from a criminal trial to justify
relaxing the constitutionally required competence standard depends
in part on institutional features defining the juvenile justice system
and its purposes. If youths facing adjudication in juvenile court are
subject to dispositions that are more lenient than criminal punishment
and that are aimed (in part) at promoting youth welfare, then the
stakes they face are lower than (and different from) those facing
criminal defendants and the need for adult procedural safeguards to
protect their interests is less compelling. Under these conditions, a
relaxed standard in delinquency proceedings may be justified, given
the disruptive impact on delinquency proceedings of applying a
143. In a "self-contained" system, no record follows the offender into adulthood, as a
basis for enhanced sentencing as an adult. This means, of course, that the conviction
should not be counted under three-strikes laws.
144. Certainly, this aptly described the traditional juvenile correctional system. If
under the recent punitive reforms, youths face adult jeopardy, their interests may be
indistinguishable from those of adults. See infra Part III.D.
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uniform standard. On the other hand, if juvenile proceedings and
criminal trials are alike in their consequences and purposes, then
accused youths should receive the same protections as criminal
defendants.
Assuming the institutional preconditions are met (for now), a
relaxed standard will meet the mandate of fundamental fairness only
if it also satisfies the underlying purposes of the criminal competence
requirement-the promotion of dignity, accuracy, and defendant
participation. Under the competence criteria that we endorse, a
youth facing a delinquency proceeding must have a basic
understanding of the charges and proceeding and of her position as
defendant in that proceeding, and the capacity to communicate with
her attorney. 145  This standard accommodates the developmental
incapacities that might leave many youths incompetent to be tried as
adults, while at the same time requiring basic comprehension of the
delinquency proceeding, its meaning, and consequences.
To elaborate a bit on the operation of a relaxed standard, a
youth faced with a serious delinquency charge must understand why
he faces a deprivation of liberty and the possible extent of that
confinement. But, because the consequences are less far-reaching
than those of a criminal proceeding, a lesser ability to foresee remote
consequences would be sufficient. The youth must also understand
that his attorney's role is to advocate for him, that the prosecutor
aims to convict and punish him, and that the judge will decide
whether he committed the crime based on the evidence. But he need
not understand how advocacy is translated into practice in a way that
would be required of an adult. He must also have the capacity to
provide his attorney with an account of relevant events and to answer
questions so that the attorney can plan and execute a defense. But he
need not have the ability to weigh the value of defense strategies, or
to advise counsel accordingly. In delinquency proceedings, attorneys
will often have an additional burden of explanation and solicitation of
assent in planning a defense. It seems likely, however, that in
practice, attorneys already play this role with younger clients, whose
questionable competence heretofore has not been expressly
acknowledged.
This standard satisfies the purposes of the competence
requirement sufficiently to protect the interests of youths in
delinquency proceedings-assuming the pre-conditions are met. The
145. This standard was proposed by Bonnie and Grisso. See Bonnie & Grisso, supra
note 18, at 76.
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dignity and integrity of the proceedings are preserved if youths are
not confused about the jeopardy they face or bewildered at the
purpose and nature of the proceedings. Accuracy is satisfied if a
young client can describe relevant events to her attorney; this
communicative role also satisfies the purpose of promoting
participation by the youthful client. What may also be important in
realizing these purposes is the development of a set of guidelines and
practices by which young defendants' understanding and effective
participation in delinquency proceedings can be enhanced. Such
guidelines might include the creation of a process that provides
adequate time for attorney-client consultation and the development
of strategies for explaining trial-related concepts grounded in
educational principles and developmental knowledge. If these goals
are taken seriously, most youths should be capable of participating in
delinquency proceedings with sufficient competence to satisfy due
process.
C. Dispositions of Incompetent Youths in Delinquency Proceedings
Even under a relaxed standard, of course, some small number of
youths will not be competent to be adjudicated in a delinquency
proceeding. In this section, we examine the responses available to
juvenile courts for the disposition of these youths. At the outset, note
that some portion of youths found incompetent by juvenile court
judges can acquire the requisite understanding through age-
appropriate instruction. Thus, a variation of the "competence
training" described earlier may be usefully deployed in delinquency
proceedings as well as criminal trials. However, immature youths
who do not respond sufficiently to instruction or cannot learn to
communicate with their attorneys in a reasonable time period cannot
be adjudicated. On a far more limited scale, we face again the
challenge that we described earlier in the context of criminal
proceedings, except that the simple solution of adjudicating
incompetent youths in a different venue is unavailable here.
Although no dispositional response will deal with every youth in
this category, several options are available that together will resolve
most cases adequately. Mental health and social service dispositions
may be appropriate for most of these youths. For some young
delinquents, mental illness may be a contributory factor to
incompetence or to the delinquent conduct; these youths may be
subject to mental health interventions including admission to
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inpatient facilities.146 Other youths may be involved in criminal
activity due to inadequate supervision and control by their parents.
In these situations, intervention by social service agencies may be
appropriate, to provide parents and their delinquent children with
services to correct problems that have contributed to the child's
delinquent behavior. If parents cannot provide adequate care and
oversight, removal of the child from the family and placement in
foster care sometimes may be necessary. Finally, in the rare case,
dismissal of the charges with no other action will be the appropriate
response.
In a regime of dual standards, very few youths will be in the
category of defendants who cannot be adjudicated in juvenile
proceedings due to their incompetence. Of this small group, some
may attain competence in a reasonable period through training, and
most of the rest will be subject to dispositions that assure that they
receive adequate supervision and useful, remedial services. Thus,
dealing with this group creates little threat of systemic crisis, in sharp
contrast to the potential disruption of both juvenile and criminal
proceedings that is likely to occur under a uniform standard.
D. Juvenile Dispositions Under a Constitutionally Adequate Regime
We have argued that dual standards will satisfy the demands of
due process if dispositions in delinquency proceedings are less
punitive than criminal sentences and have broader purposes that
include promotion of the welfare of young offenders. In this section,
we examine the institutional implications for the juvenile justice
system of these conditions. Legal authorities can satisfy these
conditions through institutional changes that range from broad
reform of juvenile dispositions to more limited accommodations that
are tailored to apply only to those youths of questionable
competence. A narrow approach presents a more modest political
challenge, but the administrative complexities will be substantial.
Lawmakers responding to the constitutional challenge we have
raised face a dilemma created by the recent trend toward harsher
juvenile justice sanctions. Under the recent reforms, the boundary
between the juvenile and adult systems has eroded in several ways.
In many states, juvenile court dispositions can extend into adulthood
146. "Even after excluding conduct disorder, nearly 60% of male juvenile detainees
and more than two-thirds of females met diagnostic criteria and had diagnosis-specific
impairment for one or more psychiatric disorders." Linda A. Teplin et al., Psychiatric




and delinquency adjudication can have far reaching consequences on
the adult lives of young offenders. These features of the modern
juvenile justice system undermine the justification for relaxed
procedural safeguards in delinquency proceedings. At a minimum,
youths who do not meet adult competence standards cannot be
subject to sanctions that approximate adult punishment or carry
consequences into adulthood.'47 To justify a relaxed competence
standard, the juvenile court dispositions imposed on these youths
should also be briefer in duration than adult sentences. For serious
felonies that carry long criminal sentences, shorter dispositions would
usually result if juvenile court age boundaries are set close to the
traditional lines. 48 However, since immature youths are likely to be
younger teens, even dispositions within these boundaries could
approximate adult sentences in duration. If so, the jeopardy facing
youths in delinquency proceedings would be similar to that of adult
defendants, and the justification for a relaxed competence standard
would not hold.
Shorter sentences and more limited consequences of juvenile
dispositions are important, but these conditions alone may be
insufficient to support applying a relaxed competence standard to
immature youths in delinquency proceedings.149 Beyond differences
in the amount of punishment, a relaxed standard is more readily
justified if these immature youths are offered correctional programs
that are tailored to the needs of young offenders and are clearly
different from those available in adult prisons. As we have
mentioned, due process analysis frequently focuses on the
government purpose in restricting liberty when procedures are
challenged for insufficient rigor. 5 ° In the juvenile justice setting, a
key purpose of programs should be to prepare immature youths for
productive, non-criminal adult lives and not simply to punish and
incapacitate them as lawbreakers. A programmatic focus
emphasizing education, job training and the acquisition of life skills,
147. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. This would include blended
sentencing, the use of juvenile records in adult sentencing, including three strikes laws, and
sex offender registration. It would also argue for closed delinquency hearings. Of course,
the text statement does not apply to youths who can be made competent in a reasonable
time. This might often be the case with mentally ill youths, but is less likely with
developmental incompetence.
148. Thus, a fourteen-year-old armed robber will be released from a juvenile
correctional facility by age eighteen or twenty-one, under the traditional jurisdictional
boundary for dispositions, while an adult armed robber can receive a longer sentence.
149. If this were sufficient, one might expect to see a sliding competence scale on the
basis of sentence duration in criminal proceedings.
150. See supra note 128.
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together with substantial investment in clinical and family support
networks to facilitate the transition to life outside of the correctional
system, define the distinctive purposes of the juvenile system in ways
that support a relaxed competence standard. 1
Despite the punitive tilt of juvenile justice policy recently, many
states have embraced these objectives. Pennsylvania, for example,
has adopted an approach based on "balanced attention" to
accountability, public protection and "the development of
competencies to enable children to become responsible and
productive members of the community."'' That state's Juvenile Act
describes goals of committing resources to skill assessment and
development in young offenders and responding to their individual
needs, and of providing opportunities for competence development.
This approach, which has been adopted by other jurisdictions as
well,"53 contrasts sharply with the conventional purposes of criminal
punishment and signals that the purposes of a delinquency
proceeding are broader than those of a criminal trial. It also
demonstrates that a goal of investing in young offenders as future
citizens can be accommodated within a justice policy that emphasizes
individual accountability and public protection.
The conditions that we have described-more lenient
dispositions that do not extend into adulthood either in duration or
consequences, and distinct programmatic goals-are essential to the
constitutional sufficiency of a relaxed competence standard in
juvenile delinquency proceedings. In executing the constitutional
mandate, some jurisdictions may opt for a "limited" approach,
insulating from punitive sanctions and regulations only those youths
who fail to meet adult competence standards, who also will be offered
educational and therapeutic programs to promote their welfare.154
Other states may undertake more comprehensive reform of their
juvenile justice systems. How the conditions are implemented will
depend in part on other policy goals.
Those who favor the recent reforms and believe that the
legitimacy of the juvenile court depends on cracking down on serious
juvenile offenders may opt for the limited approach. This response
151. See Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 547,588 n.166-67 (2000).
152. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6301(b)(2) (2004).
153. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CrS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-802(a)(2) (2003) (providing "for"
a program of services and treatment consistent with the child's best interests and the
promotion of the public interest").
154. As we have indicated, no constitutional bar restricts juvenile courts from imposing
punitive sanctions on older youths or others who satisfy adult standards of competence.
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will require the adoption of juvenile court policies and procedures
that distinguish between youths who meet adult competence
standards from those who do not. Youths facing dispositions with
adult-like consequences must meet the adult standard of competence,
while such dispositions cannot be imposed on immature youths who
are not competent under the adult standard (and will not attain
competence in a reasonable time).155 The upshot is that the juvenile
justice system would become a two-tier institution in which dual
competence standards are applied (within the juvenile court itself)
and youths are assigned to different dispositional regimes in part on
the basis of their developmental competence. A consequence of
adopting this approach is that juvenile court competence hearings
would become commonplace, resulting in considerable administrative
costs. 15 6 Those who wish to retain the punitive reforms face a tough
choice; either create a costly two-tiered system of competence within
the juvenile court itself or adopt a uniform standard under which
immature youthful offenders who do not meet the adult trial
competence standard cannot be adjudicated at all.
An alternative approach is to undertake broader reforms of the
juvenile system. The dilemma that we have described will not in itself
lead lawmakers to revise punitive policies or undertake major
changes that alter the character of the modern juvenile system-and
such comprehensive juvenile justice reform would likely face
substantial political obstacles.157 However, as trial competence gains
attention in policy discourse, those who have reservations about the
recent punitive trend may well conclude that this challenge provides
the opportunity to re-evaluate the wisdom of punitive policies and to
reassess the purposes and programs of the juvenile justice system.
E. Reevaluating the Boundary of Juvenile Justice
Incorporating developmental competence into criminal justice
policy may result in the reevaluation of another dimension of the
155. Thus, if a youth charged with a serious offense (to which a punitive sanction
ordinarily would attach) is found to be incompetent under the adult standard, she could be
tried under the relaxed standard and subject to less severe dispositions that conform to our
conditions.
156. These costs include not only judicial proceedings, but also forensic evaluations,
attorney preparation and delay. Delayed judicial proceedings undermine the efficiency of
juvenile court administration and also may dilute the sense of accountability experienced
by young offenders when their crimes and sanctions are separated by a long time period.
157. A simpler response would be to undertake comprehensive reforms but also to
retain punitive sanctions for a small category of youths charged with serious crimes. These
youths would have to meet adult competence standards.
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recent punitive trend-the expansion of the pool of juveniles
potentially subject to criminal court jurisdiction.15 8  Whether
introducing developmental competence into criminal proceedings
creates a substantial burden on the administration of justice in that
setting will depend in large part on how commonly younger teens are
tried as adults. This in turn depends, of course, on background
legislative policy, as well as on the inclinations of prosecutors
regarding the appropriate forum for adjudicating minors.
As the salience of this issue becomes clear, the costs of
evaluating and determining the developmental competence of
younger juveniles who are eligible for waiver to criminal court may
influence the legislative judgment about the age boundary between
juvenile and criminal courts. This is not to say that the minimum age
of criminal adjudication or the range of crimes for which juveniles can
be prosecuted as adults will or should be determined solely on the
basis of research-based predictions about trial competence. Many
states may conclude that the costs of competence determinations are
justified as a means to assure that youths charged with serious crimes
can be tried as adults. Moreover, in most states today, not many
younger teens are charged as adults. However, some legislatures may
conclude that excluding younger juveniles from criminal court is an
efficient means of limiting the cost of procedural protections that
would be invoked categorically by all members of this class of
defendants.159  This consideration would support adjusting the
minimum age boundary for criminal adjudication to a point nearer to
its traditional location, such that most youths tried as adults could be
expected to satisfy trial competence requirements.16 °
CONCLUSION
Many legal reforms have unintended consequences that create
costs and challenges not contemplated by lawmakers. The recent
legal trend toward criminal prosecution and punishment of juveniles
has unintentionally created a challenge of constitutional proportions.
It is clear under conventional constitutional doctrine that youths who
are incompetent to stand trial due to immaturity under the prevailing
158. See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
159. The costs include the funds spent on evaluations and hearings for all participants,
the costs of dispositions for incompetent youths, and the systemic and personal costs of
delay.
160. The research found few differences between adults and youths age sixteen and
older. Under many traditional statutes, age sixteen was the minimum age of adult
adjudication. See supra note 47.
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legal standard cannot be tried as adults or subject to adult-like
sentences in juvenile court. We have suggested that the adoption of
dual competence standards in criminal and juvenile court can satisfy
due process and goes a long way toward resolving the problem faced
by lawmakers-but only if juvenile court dispositions meet certain
conditions. Our analysis demonstrates that an innocuous procedural
protection relevant to a small group of adult defendants becomes far
more important when applied to immature youths. Both doctrinal
and institutional changes of some magnitude will be necessary to
bring criminal and juvenile delinquency proceedings into compliance
with the mandate of constitutional due process.
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